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IS THERE A RIGHT TO HAVE SOMETHING TO
SAY? ONE VIEW OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman*
INTRODUCTION
In the standard lexicon of intellectual property law, communicative
matter is divided into two parts: that which is controlled by a private
"owner" and that which resides in the public domain, "free as the air
to common use."1 Less readily reducible to a commonplace are the
* Samuel Tilden Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I give
special thanks to Professor Marci Hamilton whose skepticism about claims that
information "wants to be free" prompted me to think harder about the whole issue.
This in turn led to a consideration of the public domain-what might be in it and the
extent to which, if at all, it could be understood as being required, at least in part, as a
constitutional matter. Ultimately, I ended up believing that perhaps information, or
at least some of it, does indeed "want to be free."
I also am very grateful to my colleagues and patient readers for their
encouragement, insights and suggestions: Edwin Baker, Michael Birnhack, Rochelle
Dreyfuss, Harry First, Barry Friedman, David Lange, Jessica Litman, Neil Netanel,
Robert Post, Steven Seigel, and Michael Zimmer. Thanks also for the helpful
comments from participants in the faculty seminar at Loyola University Chicago and
the conference Copyright Law as Communications Policy: Convergence of Paradigms
and Cultures held at Cardozo Law School in April 2001, where the preliminary ideas
in this paper were first sketched out.
Much thanks is also owed to my research assistants, Kate Starshak, for her help
starting this project during my Fall 2001 visit at DePaul University College of Law,
and Alma Asay at New York University School of Law, for helping to complete it at
long last. This research was supported in substantial part by the generosity of the
Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at New York University
School of Law.
1. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
The public domain, as I use the term in this paper, is one consisting of
communicative material. All of the public domain is free for anyone to use without
prior permission and, I would argue, without charge, but some of what is in the public
domain could be made subject to an intellectual property regime by legislative or
judicial choice. For example, in earlier versions of the copyright laws, Congress did
not choose to cover everything that was constitutionally eligible. Some forms of
"writings" were initially omitted and not added until later versions of the statute were
passed. "Writings" eligible but not protected by statute were in the public domain,
although there was no necessity for them to be there. See infra notes 5, 18, 24. Other
materials, however, as this Article will attempt to show, are of a sort not subject to
commodification and reside in what I will refer to hereafter as the "mandatory"
public domain.
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principles that govern how informational material-which I will refer
to hereafter using the collective term "speech goods" 2-should be
sorted into one or the other of these categories. In particular, very
little thought has been devoted to asking whether, under the
American legal system, the decision is wholly discretionary that a
certain bit of information, an idea, or even the concrete expression of
a specific author should ultimately be "free as the air" or subject
instead to private control. Might it be convincingly argued that courts
and legislatures are actually required to leave some sorts of speech
goods available for common use? Or, to put it differently, might some
aspects of the public domain be "mandatory" and legally beyond the
reach of property regimes?
This question has long been nascent in debates over the public
domain, but it was thrown into high relief recently by two recent
cases3 that presented challenges to copyright restoration under a
provision of the Uruguay Round Agreemetits Act ("URAA").4
Section 514 of the URAA amended the Copyright Act of 1976 by
permitting copyright to be restored, under certain circumstances, to
works of foreign authors or their assigns who had lost protection in
the United States by failing to comply with certain technical
requirements5 of American law. 6 In Luck's Music Library, Inc. v.
The reader should be aware, however, that no standard definition of the public
domain exists. Some scholars would include some "owned" material in the public
domain, such as work that can be freely used under copyright's fair use doctrine. See,
e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 361-62 (1999) [hereinafter
Benkler, Free as the Air]. Recent papers discuss a variety of possible meanings for the
term "public domain." See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and
the Construction of the Public Domain, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2003,
at 33, 58-62 [hereinafter Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement]; see also Charlotte
Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-
Pool Resource, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2003, at 111, 114-28.
2. This term is intended to capture a range of inputs from external sources-the
bits and pieces that make up the raw material of speech-that, when assembled in an
individual's mind, become the fodder for his or her own knowledge base as well as
that on which he or she draws to express him or herself to others. Sometimes things,
such as inventions, may also be referred to as "in the public domain" in the sense that
they can be replicated by anyone without a license, but the term "public domain," as
used in this Article, applies only to speech goods. This Article will not address the
public domain as it relates to tangibles, as distinguished from information.
3. Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2004);
Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004).
4. Pub. L. No. 103-465, sec. 514, § 104A, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976 (1994) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000)).
5. Prior to joining the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works in 1988, the United States imposed a number of requirements for
perfecting and retaining copyrights that other countries did not. For example,
publishing in the United States without a proper copyright notice, or failing to file a
notice of renewal before the end of the first twenty-eight years of protection (for
works first published before 1978), meant that a work never attained-or prematurely
lost-copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(B). The 1909 Act permitted
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Ashcroft and Golan v. Ashcroft, the plaintiffs challenged section 514
by arguing that Congress had no power under either the First
Amendment (the "Free Speech and Press Clauses")7 or Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution (the "Intellectual
Property Clause") 8 to take works already in the public domain and
place them back under an intellectual property regime.
The government moved to dismiss in both instances.9 But while one
court found that neither constitutional provision was violated, 1° the
other" refused to dismiss on the ground that both claims were legally
cognizable. 2 These cases are likely to proceed up through the
appellate process and may well be the occasion for the judiciary to
address directly something it has never before faced in a serious way:
to wit, whether entry into the public domain is permanent.
The restoration question, however, implicates only a portion of the
potential scope of a mandatory public domain. The works at issue in
the restoration controversy are ones that are, by their nature, facially
eligible for protection under the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution. The problem, for public domain purposes, arises
because the attempt to give them such protection occurs after they
have unambiguously lost or failed to acquire the status of intellectual
property to which they were initially entitled. In other instances,
questions about the nature and requirements of the public domain
arise because courts or legislators want to give some form of
intellectual property status to speech goods not normally thought to
be eligible for such status.
Because discussions of the public domain have largely addressed
the costs and benefits to creators and the economy of a rich versus a
limited speech commons, little attention has been focused on whether
constraints independent of the criteria already mentioned limit
lawmakers' decisions on what to inject or withdraw from the public
domain. What might such constraints be, and how strong or weak a
copyright to endure for up to fifty-six years, if renewal occurred in a timely fashion.
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080.
6. The amendment applied to works protected under the laws of countries
adhering to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
other intellectual property treaties, or belonging to the World Trade Organization. 17
U.S.C. § 104A(h)(1), (3).
7. U.S. Const. amend. I.
8. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). This
clause is also referred to as the "Copyright and Patent Clause."
9. Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 108 (D.D.C. 2004);
Golar v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1216 (D. Colo. 2004).
10. Luck's Music Library, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d at 117-19.
11. Golan, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1218-20.
12. The Colorado court was somewhat more dubious about the strength of a third
claim that copyright restoration violated substantive due process, but also refused to
dismiss it. Id. at 1220-21.
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case can be made that they exist? Filling that gap is the goal of this
Article.
The inquiry is divided into four parts. Part I provides the context
for this Article. It explains how views of the public domain have
changed over time, and indicates some reasons why contemporary
approaches to defending the public domain fall short in the effort to
ward off the constant appetite for expanding the boundaries of
intellectual property. It then suggests that problems of balancing
property rights against free use might look quite different if it could
be shown that some forms of speech goods simply cannot be
converted to private control. At this point, the emphasis shifts to an
examination of the argument that a mandatory public domain indeed
exists.
Part II analyzes the Intellectual Property Clause's contribution to
the hypothesis that there is a mandatory public domain and shows
how it falls short. This section is not a completely fleshed-out account
of all that could be said on this subject. Rather, it briefly suggests
some of the clearest ways in which the Intellectual Property Clause
contributes to the theory of a mandatory commons. It also indicates
some current difficulties in interpreting the Clause and questions the
viability of using the Clause to make the whole, or even a substantial
part, of the case for strict limitations on novel forms of intellectual
property.
Concern that the Intellectual Property Clause theory by itself is not
up to the job of policing the line between private rights and the public
domain has led many scholars in recent years to turn instead to the
First Amendment of the Constitution for assistance.13 Part III, the
heart of this Article, similarly turns to the First Amendment. The
section starts with an explanation of why, in theory, one would expect
free speech doctrine to require the existence of a large, protected
commons of communicative materials. It then goes on to identify and
evaluate the evidence for and against this proposition before
concluding that, despite some contradictions and difficulties, the free
speech case is a strong one. Finally, in Part IV, I attempt to sketch the
outlines of what I understand to be the mandatory portion of the
public domain, and to identify preliminarily some implications it will
have for the future directions of intellectual property law.
I. THE CONTEXT: CHANGING APPROACHES TO ANALYZING AND
VALUING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
To ask the question whether some speech goods must stay in the
public domain is to wade into an important and much broader
controversy over commodification versus free use; the controversy
and the reasons for it are a necessary starting point for this Article's
13. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 73
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special inquiry. Today, the public domain-its nature and its
importance-is a subject that divides legislators, corporate and
individual participants in creative endeavors, practicing lawyers, and
intellectual property scholars in ways that, I suspect, would astonish
their counterparts of even twenty-five or fifty years ago. 14
Historically, no pressing need existed to defend the centrality of a rich
public domain or even to define its components in detail because the
importance of keeping as much communicative material as possible
out of private control was simply assumed.15 Free use, and not
14. A glance back at writings of well known scholars in the field of intellectual
property shows a reasonably consistent pattern of support for a rich public domain. A
typical example of this point of view can be found in this paragraph from the writings
of Ralph Brown:
Emphasis on the protected domain leads to neglect of the public domain.
There are masses of writings and discoveries that are open to the public-for
good reasons.... It is not only ideas that circulate in the public domain
without paying toll. All sorts of literary and artistic products are likewise
open; and this helps to satisfy another vital interest: the national policy
pressing toward competition as the best way our economy knows of
satisfying wants efficiently and therefore cheaply.
Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright,
24 UCLA L. Rev. 1070, 1093 (1977); see also Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View
Of Copyright 112, 115, 125 (1967) [hereinafter Kaplan, An Unhurried View]
(expressing a preference for copyright legislation that puts as much as possible into
the public domain at the earliest feasible time); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on
the Law of Copyright (pt. 2), 45 Colum. L. Rev. 719, 721-22, 730 (1945) (discussing his
preference for and the advantages of public domain status for works of authorship at
earliest possible time); Benjamin Kaplan, Revision of the Copyright Law, 52 Law
Libr. J. 3, 7 (1959) [hereinafter Kaplan, Copyright Law]; cf Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1966) (laying out the reasons why the granting of patents should
be the exception and why most innovations should move immediately into the public
domain).
15. Several of the judges involved in deciding the eighteenth-century litigation in
Britain involving the existence and duration of common law copyright expressed real
doubt, for example, that any property right could be found, not merely in the author's
ideas, but also in his expression of them, absent a statutory copyright. See, e.g., Millar
v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 234 (K.B. 1769) (Yates, J., dissenting); Proceedings in the
Lords on the Question of Literary Property, 17 Parl. Hist. Eng. 953, 972, 997 (1774)
(remarks of Baron Eyre and Lord Camden regarding Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng.
Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774)). For discussions of this history, see Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of
the Law: The English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric of the Public Domain, Law
& Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2003, at 75; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman,
Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and
the Bill of Rights, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 665 (1992) [hereinafter Zimmerman,
Information as Speech]. Even in the nineteenth century, objections to the idea of
copyright continued to be expressed. See Catherine Seville, Literary Copyright
Reform in Early Victorian England 24, 30 (1999) (reporting doubts expressed by
members of Parliament, including Thomas Wakley, Henry Warburton, and Joseph
Hume, about the defensibility of copyright generally). In the debates over an
extension of the term of copyrights, several members of Parliament favored sharply
limited terms for statutory copyright out of concern over the negative effects of
monopolies and out of a desire to promote public education. Id. at 46-48. A speech
on the negative impact of lengthy monopolies by author Thomas Babington Macaulay
is often credited with the initial defeat of what later became the Copyright Act of
1842 in Britain. Id. at 64-66.
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intellectual property status, was understood to be the preferred or
natural state for speech goods.16
Aside from permitting some limited control over the words and
symbols used to identify the source of consumer goods, 7 or an
occasional recourse to notions of common law copyright,18 the main
way that speech goods could be kept out of the public domain, for at
least a while, was through formal statutory copyright. Even under a
statutory scheme, however, private rights were narrowly crafted and
the monopoly conferred was only partial. The justification for this
may be traced to familiar description of copyright as a "bargain"
between authors and the public, 9 in which the author receives a
limited term of protection from the copying of her expression as an
incentive to produce,2 while the public receives access to a new work
and complete freedom to utilize its ideas and the factual content of
the work.21  After several years, even the formerly protected
16. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property
Law, 1900-2000, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2187, 2239-40 (2000) [hereinafter Merges, Solicitude].
Professor Seville, for example, points out that a proposal to lengthen the term of
British copyright in the nineteenth century led to vigorous protests. Seville, supra
note 15, at 21-22. Many argued that increasing the term of the property right in
expression was unacceptable because it would have potential deleterious effects on
public education. Id. at 21-22, 105-09.
17. Trademarks, although not mentioned in the Constitution's Intellectual
Property Clause, were a well-recognized form of intellectual property at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution. Trademarks were protected insofar as they
identified the source of goods, thereby allowing producers to enjoy the goodwill they
built up in relation to their businesses and preventing consumer deception. For a
discussion of the history of trademarks and their origins in medieval guilds, see
Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 173, 173 (1949).
18. Common law copyright was used in the United States largely to protect
unpublished writings at a time when statutory copyright was available only upon
publication. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077-78
("[Any person entitled thereto by this Act may secure copyright for his work by
publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this Act ... "). For a
discussion of the development of common law copyright, see Zimmerman,
Information as Speech, supra note 15, at 692-98. When the 1976 Copyright Act moved
the attachment of copyright back to the point of fixation in tangible form, 17 U.S.C. §
102(a) (2000) (stating that copyright subsists in works "fixed in any tangible medium
of expression"), Congress replaced common law protection for unpublished works
with a statutory, limited term of copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 303.
19. The most recent use of this language was in the Supreme Court's last
copyright case, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214-16, 231 n.7 (2003).
20. The notion that copyright is limited to the author's own expression and not to
the underlying content of the work is central to copyright. For classic statements of
this principle, see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (copyright covers the book
but not the content expressed therein) and Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (discussing at length the dividing line between protected
expression and unprotected ideas).
21. Some courts did give copyright protection to the contents of factual
compilations using a "sweat of the brow" theory. See, e.g., Leon v. Pac. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Jeweler's Circular Publ'g Co. v. Keystone Publ'g Co.,
281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922). See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial
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expression in the work becomes part of the public domain.2  The
public domain could pretty accurately be defined as all published
expression that copyright did not cover-in other words, it was huge.
Although the privileges enjoyed under the copyright statute have
grown more expansive over time, the interest remains limited to the
author's original expression, and excludes from coverage, in addition
to facts and ideas, even discrete elements of the work's expression,
such as individual words or phrases used by the author. Thus it can
still be said that most of a copyrighted work continues to be, from the
perspective of the statute, donated to the public domain upon
publication.23 And even if the duration of copyright is starting to look
more like "forever" than like a limited time, works nonetheless
continue to lose protection in the end and become available to each of
us to process, reframe, discuss, and even copy in their entirety. 24 As a
result, no permission need be sought today to quote, republish, or
Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1865 (1990).
This practice, which was never universally accepted among the lower courts, was
thoroughly discredited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
22. The writings of Thomas Jefferson (who drafted the 1793 Patent Act and
helped administer the patent system as Secretary of State) make clear that he saw
inventions and writings as things that became a public good as soon as they were
communicated to others. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966).
Jefferson rejected the notion that an individual had any natural right to own ideas
and argued that positive law alone was what created property rights in mental
product-if, and only if, it was beneficial to society to do so. Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
180-81 (H.A. Washington ed., 1859) (cited in Graham, 383 U.S. at 8 n.2). Jefferson
was a strong supporter of the limited term provision of the Intellectual Property
Clause, even going so far as to express his preference for a maximum term of
protection to be set out in the Constitution itself. Graham, 383 U.S. at 8.
23. Similarly, patent law donates the information about an invention to the public
up front. A patent application must disclose the nature of the invention in detail, and
although the public cannot practice the art during the period of the patent, it can use
the information disclosed in a variety of other ways. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-112 (2000).
24. This was not always so. First, through monopolies granted to printers, and
subsequently through those granted to the members of the Stationers Company,
rights could be obtained in old and new works alike. See Seville, supra note 15, at 3-4.
Monopolies in the publication, for example, of the Book of Psalms or of the works of
Shakespeare could be, and were, asserted and protected. See Donaldson v. Beckett, 1
Eng. Rep. 837, 842 (H.L. 1774). This state of affairs continued until the passage of the
Statute of Anne, when copyrights in older works were phased out. 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710)
(Eng.); see also infra note 25. The booksellers were not discouraged by the statutory
limit imposed on their claimed rights, however, and attempted to assert that common
law rights in the works under their control kicked back in after the statutory period of
protection lapsed. Donaldson, 1 Eng. Rep. at 846-47. This argument was initially
successful, Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 262 (K.B. 1769), but ultimately, the
House of Lords concluded that common law rights did not continue to survive after
the term of statutory copyright lapsed, Donaldson, 1 Eng. Rep. at 846-47. A similar
conclusion was reached in the United States. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591
(1834). This meant that older works became part of the public domain. For a
comprehensive and fascinating history of these developments, see generally Lyman
Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (1968) and Rose, supra note 15.
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adapt the works of a vast array of earlier authors, from Plato to
Chaucer to Shakespeare, to Newton, Dickens, Melville, or Darwin."
This state of affairs, where speech goods once communicated were
free for use except as limited by copyright law, was long accepted as
both just and pragmatically desirable since it promoted individual
intellectual growth and provided fodder for the development of new
products of the human imagination.
Times change, however, and old orthodoxies quickly morph into
discredited doctrine. In intellectual property, modern technologies of
communication and expanded opportunities for global trade now
offer new opportunities for great private gain whenever individuals
and entities can increase the kinds or scope of control they enjoy over
various subsets of speech goods. Intellectual property is no longer a
sleepy legal backwater, but a prime area of economic activity. That
change has brought inexorable pressure to not only expand the scope
of protection granted to traditional subjects of intellectual property,26
but also to place new forms and aspects of speech goods within the
property fold. Millions of dollars a year, for example, can be garnered
by someone who holds a legal right to control information about a
25. At the outset, as a transition measure, even ancient works in print could be
protected by statutory copyright for a brief period of time under both English and
American law. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124; Statute of Anne, 8
Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.) (giving 21 years of protection to "the author of any book or
books already printed, . . . or the bookseller or booksellers, printer or printers, or
other person or persons, who hath or have purchased or acquired the copy or copies
of any book or books, in order to print or reprint the same"); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 194 (2003) (noting that the initial U.S. copyright statute protected already
published works). Once the English and American laws were in place, however,
copyrights would then issue only for newly published works. The Statute of Anne
specified that "the author of any book or books... that shall hereafter be
composed.., shall have the sole liberty of printing and reprinting such book and
books for the term of fourteen years, to commence from the day of the first
publishing the same." 8 Ann., c.19 (Eng.). The first American copyright statute also
made clear that, going forward, only newly published works could receive protection.
See Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. at 124.
26. For example, the Copyright Act of 1976 extended copyright terms from
twenty-eight years with a possible twenty-eight year renewal to the life of the author
plus fifty years. Pub. L. No. 94-553, sec. 101, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2572 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000)). The term was extended again recently for an
additional period of twenty years by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 302).
Various other expansionary changes in copyright were made following adherence in
1989 to the Berne Convention. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, July 14, 1967, art. 7, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 235; see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104A
(providing for the restoration of copyrights for foreign works formerly in the public
domain in the United States); 17 U.S.C. § 106A (providing moral rights protections
for visual artists). Another example of expanded protection can be found in the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985, 985
(1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)) (adding injunctive relief as
a remedy for the dilution of a trademark); cf Merges, Solicitude, supra note 16, at
2235-39.
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famous person21 or to grant or deny permission to reutilize all or part
of the contents of a published database.28 Adding to the problem, new
ancillary legal regimes and new technologies give individuals tools
that enable them to define their own intellectual property rights, and,
increasingly, to enforce those "rights" without recourse to the courts.29
27. The right of publicity, a property interest that allows the owner to exercise
exclusive rights over the commercial use of identifying information about an
individual, was first created in the 1950s by Judge Jerome Frank. Haelan Labs., Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). It has subsequently been
widely adopted. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995); J.
Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 1.1(A)(1) (1999). The right
of publicity can be a source of considerable revenue. It has been reported that golf
star Tiger Woods earns $50 to $60 million a year from exploiting his publicity rights.
See Dave Anderson, Big Money, a Broken Bat and a Wonder Named Woods, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 31, 2000, § 8, at 1; Grainger David, Tiger Woods, Fortune, Apr. 30, 2001,
at 25; Bob Garfield, 2000. The Year in Review; People, Advertising Age, Dec. 18,
2000, at 38. Retired basketball player Michael Jordan and rap artist Scan (P. Diddy)
Combs are other examples of sports stars and entertainers who make tens of millions
of dollars each year from exploiting the value of their names and images. Polly
Devaney, Celebrities Vie for a Part of the Own-Brand Market, Marketing Wk.
(London), July 19, 2001, at 28, available at LEXIS, News library, MKGWK file
(regarding Combs' successful efforts to exploit his fame as a way to market clothing);
Associated Press, Jordan Wants Out of Endorsements, Columbian (Vancouver,
Wash.), Mar. 23, 2000, at C4, available at LEXIS, News library, COLMBN file
(estimating Jordan's endorsement income for 1997 at forty million dollars); Guy
Trebay, Fashion Statement: Hip-Hop on Runway, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 2002, at Al
(describing the success of Combs' clothing label).
28. Congress, for example, has been debating for several years now the possibility
of passing a database protection statute that, although it does not quite create a
property right in information, comes very close to doing so. For discussions of various
drafts of this legislation, see Paul Bender, The Constitutionality of Proposed Federal
Database Protection Legislation, 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 143 (2003); Yochai Benkler,
Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the
Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 535,
541-52 (2000) [hereinafter Benkler, Constitutional Bounds]; Jane C. Ginsburg,
Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United
States and Abroad, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 151 (1997) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Sui Generis
Protection]. For a recent argument that facts should be protected under copyright
rather than by sui generis legislation, see Michael Steven Green, Copyrighting Facts,
78 Ind. L. J. 919 (2003). States similarly have gotten into the business of protecting
nontraditional material. For example, many states recognize the right of publicity,
which is an ownership interest in the commercial exploitation of an individual's
personal identifying characteristics. See supra note 27.
29. One indirect way to create and maintain intellectual property rights is to give
private individuals legal tools for circulating speech goods that permit them, when
they circulate speech goods, to set their own terms for how purchasers can access and
use the materials. This can occur through the statutory or judicial validation of non-
negotiated shrink-wrap contracts. See, e.g., ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th
Cir. 1996) (upholding a contract term prohibiting commercial reuse of facts from a
computerized compilation). The Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act
("UCITA"), approved by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1999, covers
such contracts. Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act, at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita_99.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
UCITA has been adopted in Virginia and Maryland. A Few Facts About the ...
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp (Aug. 1,
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Thus, thinking of speech goods as property now seems more and more
like the norm, and faith in the positive value of the public domain has
waned.30
These developments have tended to leave thoughtful people, all
believers in their own ways in the desirability of a vibrant and
innovative information environment, arrayed on different sides of a
deep intellectual divide. On one ledge stand the public domain
skeptics, who for one reason or another do not recognize the
preservation of a rich public domain as in any sense fundamental to
sound intellectual property theory. One school of thought on this side
of the divide holds the concept of the public domain to be a wholly
rhetorical one, in reality, representing nothing more than a repository
for what is left over after positive property rights have been taken into
account. 31  Others may take a less dismissive approach, but
nevertheless argue that the public domain is not something to which
the public is entitled; rather, they see it wholly as an optional subsidy
to the public.3" The most negative among the skeptics would go so far
2003). Although the draft act will remain on the books, the State Commissioners
decided at their annual meeting in 2003 to no longer push for state passage because
UCITA continued to generate a high degree of controversy. See UCITA Standby
Committee Is Discharged, at
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopModules/NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemlD=56 (last
visited Aug. 25, 2004). The Digital Millenium Copyright Act ("DMCA") also
provides legal artillery to help protect copyrighted works. See Pub. L. No. 105-304, ch.
12, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205
(2000)). The DMCA prohibits the distribution of tools of any kind that would allow
users to circumvent technological self-help devices that control access to or use of
copyrighted works. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.
2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (publishing DeCSS code, which can be used to de-encrypt
movies in DVD format, violates the DMCA), afTd sub nom. Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
30. As one prominent scholar has pointed out, reliance on the weight of tradition
or on history is no longer enough to win an argument over whether to protect the
public domain. Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and Perhaps
Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in
Copyright Law, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 595, 596 (1996). Jaszi goes on to say:
My aim is to suggest that in today's new discursive climate, those who care
about the survival of the public domain must begin to find new, and newly
compelling, vocabularies with which to articulate their concerns. Unless
they do so, they risk the consequences of discovering that familiar
constitutionally-grounded arguments for limitations on proprietary rights
will become irrelevant in tomorrow's intellectual property policy debates.
Id.
31. See Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. Copyright
Soc'y USA 137, 137 (1993). Professor Samuels was among the earliest to express
skepticism about the public domain as either a coherent concept or a foundational
element of intellectual property law.
32. Robert Merges is among those who conceive of the public domain as a subsidy
to users. He suggests that redistribution of the subsidy from users to owners is not
problematic if, in the judgment of lawmakers, public policy objectives are better
served by doing so. Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and
Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-line Commerce, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 115,
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as to claim that public domain status is actually detrimental to social
welfare, arguing that material, once consigned to it, typically is
relegated to oblivion.33
Increasingly, law and economics scholarship has also weighed in on
the anti-public domain side, arguing that information resources are
more likely to be created and exploited at optimal levels under a
comprehensive private control regime than under one that relies on a
large public domain.34 This tack, carried to its logical conclusion,
134-35 (1997).
33. In Eldred v. Reno, for example, Judge Ginsburg of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, in the course of concluding that the recent twenty-year extension of the
copyright term for existing works does "promote Progress," suggested that it was
romantic nonsense to believe that works are better off in the public domain. 239 F.3d
372, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001), affid sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
When copyright ends, Judge Ginsburg wrote, works that are no longer private
property are likely to "disappear-not enter the public domain but disappear." Id.
Keeping them under statutory protection makes them more accessible to the public.
Id.
34. See Douglas G. Baird, Does Bogart Still Get Scale? Rights of Publicity in the
Digital Age, 4 Green Bag 2d 357 (2001) [hereinafter Baird, Does Bogart Still Get
Scale?]. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325 (1989). In his paper, Baird contrasts
his views on the public domain with those of the preeminent copyright scholar,
Benjamin Kaplan, as follows:
Kaplan believed that there would always be a frontier that marks the
boundary between privately owned intellectual property and the open
wilderness that is the public domain. While we want to protect creators, we
need a large public domain as well.
Many follow Kaplan and believe that preserving the public domain is a
principal goal of intellectual property law. In this paper, however, I ask
whether this intuition still makes sense. Perhaps the principal problem is no
longer one of preserving the public domain but understanding how the law
of intellectual property should function in a world in which our cultural icons
and symbols are increasingly privately owned. To a very large extent,
Kaplan's frontier may no longer exist.
Baird, Does Bogart Still Get Scale?, supra, at 357. He uses Mickey Mouse, who
narrowly avoided public domain status by virtue of an extension of the term of
copyright in 1998, as one illustration:
It is not necessarily a bad thing that Disney still owns rights to Mickey
Mouse. It gives Disney an incentive to preserve this icon. Without
intellectual property protection, there would be nothing to stop cheap
reproductions and the dilution and tarnishing that comes with it, Without
intellectual property protection, there would be nothing to stop the use of
Mickey for any and all purposes. Our world is not necessarily a better place
if anyone can show Mickey Mouse shooting heroin, as indeed someone has
tried.
Id. at 363.
Professor Samuels has taken something of the same approach, arguing that no one
can assert with assurance that a rich public domain serves the public interest better
than private ownership would. See Samuels, supra note 31, at 160-61. A rather
different form of public domain skepticism appears in the scholarship of Professor R.
Polk Wagner. He argues that enclosure is a good way to promote innovation and that
enlarging the public domain would be less effective in spurring creativity. Wagner
also assumes, however, that what he terms "spillovers"--the informational content
revealed from inventions and contained in copyrighted works-will escape enclosure
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
suggests that society would be better served if the bulk of speech
goods, including factual information and ideas of a sort once assumed
to be incapable of ownership, were put on the table as possible centers
of private profit.
Across the chasm, defenders of the public domain awakened to the
fact that they could no longer rely on shared assumptions, but now
needed to effectively explicate and defend the importance of a rich
information commons.35 Much of the important scholarship on the
subject, starting with the path-breaking work of Professors David
Lange and Jessica Litman, attempts to explain why, if the public
domain is significantly shrunk, it will pose a real risk to the
workability of the intellectual property regime, the vibrancy of the
intellectual and imaginative life of society at large, and the process of
innovation itself.36 Arguments in favor of a generous public domain
tend to turn, as do those of its opponents, largely on pragmatic
judgments about what will best promote a healthy intellectual
property policy,37  or on some philosophical or normative
and will be added to the public domain. R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be
Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 995,
1005-08 (2003). My own motivation for writing this article is that I am worried about
increasing numbers of efforts to enclose those spillovers. While I agree with
Professor Wagner that information is difficult to enclose fully, significant interference
is something to worry about, and, should it occur, would undercut his argument to a
greater or lesser degree.
35. Defenders of the public domain are numerous. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Authors,
Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public
Domain (Part I), 18 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 1 (1994); Benkler, Free as the Air, supra
note 1; Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional
Foundations of the Public Domain, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2003, at
173 [hereinafter Benkler, Through the Looking Glass]; James Boyle, A Theory of
Law and Information: Copyrights, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 Cal. L.
Rev. 1415 (1992); Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement, supra note 1, at 33; Wendy
J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1556-57 (1993); David Lange,
Recognizing the Public Domain, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1981, at 147
[hereinafter Lange, Recognizing]; David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, Law
& Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2003, at 463; Jessica Litman, The Public Domain,
39 Emory L.J. 965 (1990); L. Ray Patterson & Judge Stanley F. Birch, Jr., Copyright
and Free Speech Rights, 4 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1 (1996); see also L. Ray Patterson &
Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users' Rights 50 (1991)
(arguing for the centrality of the public domain to copyright).
36. See supra note 35. Yochai Benkler, for example, argues persuasively that
allowing copyright owners too broad control over their current product will reduce
the amount of fresh and innovative cultural production in the future because the
cheaper option will be for owners to recycle existing characters, properties, and ideas.
Benkler, Free as the Air, supra note 1, at 397-98.
37. Litman argues that because we all use so many of the same resources to create
new works, the concept of a public domain is needed to prevent material not original
to a particular author from being walled off for her private control by intellectual
property rules. Litman, supra note 35, at 1010-22. As Litman puts it, the purpose of
copyright is to nurture authorship, not authors, and the public domain is essential in
achieving that goal. Id. at 969. Some argue that efficient levels of future innovation
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understanding of the role of property rights and justifications for
awarding them.38
This scholarship is enlightening, but unfortunately has not proven
altogether persuasive in the public arena. In a high proportion of
legislative and judicial disputes in recent years, defenders of the public
domain have tended to lose in the face of their opponents' claims that
important economic benefits will flow from recognizing new or
enlarged private rights in, say, formal copyright, or in the developing
areas of data protection and publicity rights.39
Clearly, the experiment has not yet been devised to prove
empirically who has the better side of the policy argument. I confess
upfront that my sympathies and instincts align me with the defenders
of a rich public domain. I am inclined to bet on an instrumental level
that a broad commons will best promote innovation.4"
will not be achieved if creators are unduly burdened by cumbersome permission or
payment obligations.
Professor Benkler argues in favor of a rich public domain using the Constitution as
part of the basis of his case. Benkler, Free as the Air, supra note 1, at 358. He also
emphasizes the policy benefits, such as the encouragement of more diverse, new
works of authorship. See id. at 408. He argues, in particular, that impecunious
individuals and small organizations would find it more difficult, absent a rich public
domain, to afford access to the preexisting information products they need as inputs
for their own creations if those inputs were not in the public domain. See id. at 408-12;
see also Kaplan, An Unhurried View, supra note 14, at 24 (discussing the fact that at
many times in history, the ability to imitate past works was more highly valued and
deemed more worthwhile than innovativeness).
38. Professor Wendy Gordon supplies a rich exegesis of the natural law theories
of John Locke to explain the significance in intellectual property of a rich public
domain. Gordon argues that, under Lockean notions of property, private rights are
justified only if "enough and as good" is left in the commons for others, and if
granting the property right also can be shown to increase the total social welfare. For
these two conditions to be satisfied, Gordon says, much of the stuff from which
intellectual products are constructed must remain free for everyone to use. Gordon,
supra note 35, at 1540-60. For a discussion of Locke's role in framing ideas about
intellectual property, see Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note 15, at 676-
77.
39. Two counter-examples where pro-public domain advocates may have helped
stem the intellectual property tidal wave include discouraging widespread adoption of
UCITA, see supra note 29, and in staving off passage of database protection
legislation in the United States, despite ongoing pressure for Congress to copy the
European model. See Council Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the Legal
Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20; J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A
Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly
Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Winter/Spring 2003, at 315, 329 (remarking on the divide between U.S. and European
attitudes to a public domain for data); see also supra note 28. For a discussion of the
European approach, see Jane C. Ginsburg, US Initiatives to Protect Works of Low
Authorship, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy
for the Knowledge Society 55 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
40. At one level, belief in the benefits of a broad public domain rests simply on
observation. A de minimus property regime (limited to some fairly basic, time-bound
prohibition against literal copying) and an ample public domain is the type of legal
regime that was in place for generations in the United States, and it has demonstrated
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On a deeper level, however, I would also argue that the
preservation of a rich public domain is normatively correct even if
commodification of speech goods were actually to turn out to be the
most efficient way to promote their creation and dissemination. This
statement reflects a belief that the personal and social values of
autonomy and participation in self governance that are supported by
access to a large commons generally ought to trump efficiency where a
choice cannot be avoided. The increasing enclosure of speech goods
exacts costs from non-owners who want to engage in their own public
or private speech. Whenever speech goods can be used only with
permission, or even merely with payment, some things that might be
said or written or painted or otherwise given expressive form by
individuals will not be produced.
The concern over these costs is what animated my interest in
whether the Constitution may impose general limits on legally
sanctioned privatization. If at least some speech goods could not be
removed from the public domain, the arena for further policy-based
disputes over extensions of intellectual property would be
circumscribed and easier to negotiate.
Such an inquiry must be prefaced by the recognition that it is far
easier to find support in the Constitution for property rights in speech
goods than to locate sources for a mandatory public domain. The
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution41 expressly grants
power to Congress to create a time-limited42 private monopoly over
those speech goods that are writings original to an author.43 If one
considers computer programs to be communicative works," then
some forms of speech goods may even legitimately qualify for a
patent.45
But beyond the categories of clearly permissible, constitutionally-
based intellectual property rights lies a vast, disputed territory. Even
some aspects of formal copyright (for example, as noted earlier,
itself compatible with a high level of social and intellectual welfare. Little empirical
evidence exists that ever-higher levels of intellectual property protection will improve
on those results. This point has been made with regard to database protection. The
European Union has adopted a stringent intellectual property regime protecting
databases, ostensibly to get a foothold in a market that has been dominated by a
country-the United States-where collected data receives little in the way of
meaningful protection from the law. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 39, at 355.
41. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Intellectual Property Clause specifies that
"exclusive Right(s]" shall only be granted for "limited Times." Id.
42. The meaning of a limited time itself is deeply embued with discretionary
elements. For example, the Supreme Court recently concluded that Congress had not
gone beyond a limited time when it extended the term of copyright by an additional
twenty years for old and new works alike. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
43. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346-47 (1999).
44. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding
computer programs to be a form of expression); Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th
Cir. 2000) (same).
45. See generally Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 99 (2000).
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provisions that restore copyright to certain foreign works that have
fallen into the public domain) are problematic.46  And certainly,
protection for speech goods by means other than formal copyright-
for example, through rights of publicity, the common law tort of
misappropriation, direct and indirect efforts to protect factual
material compiled into databases, the expansion of trade secrecy law, 47
and the broadening of legal protections for trademark holders against
disparagement and dilution48-go well beyond the constitutional text.
All of these increase the opportunity for private parties to control who
can use facts, ideas, expression and even words, as well as the
conditions under which they may do so. If a constitutional basis for
recognizing some form of "mandatory public domain," particularly
46. Compare Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C.
2004), with Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004) (disagreeing over
whether constitutional challenges to restoration of copyrights are sufficiently
meritorious to withstand motions to dismiss). Also, definitions of patentable or
copyrightable subject matter have sufficient malleability to permit certain materials to
shift into intellectual property even though such materials might, using a different
definition, be deemed exempt from either patent or copyright. One such example is
copyright's often tenuous line between the unprotectable idea and protectable
expression, which often results in considerable disagreement about what can and
cannot be protected. Compare, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.,
797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The purpose or function of a utilitarian work
would be the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or
function would be part of the expression of the idea." (emphasis omitted)), with
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying a far
more stringent abstraction and filtration approach to separate ideas and other
unprotectable elements from the program's expression). See generally Alfred C. Yen,
A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a
Work's "Total Concept and Feel," 38 Emory L.J. 393 (1989).
47. See, e.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 1(2)(ii)(B)-(C) (1985) (making illegal
the disclosure of trade secrets by third parties who are aware that their source was not
entitled to reveal the information), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1980s/utsa85.htm (last visited Aug. 25,
2004). The constitutionality of this provision, adopted by California in its civil code,
was recently litigated. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(b)(2)(B)-(C) (West 1997); see DVD
Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1 (2003); infra notes 246-54 and accompanying
text.
48. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act makes actionable any use that "causes
dilution of the distinctive quality of [a famous] mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
Dilution is a cause of action that covers situations where the capacity of the mark to
identify and distinguish goods is lessened, even though the use in question does not
mislead or deceive as to the origins of a good or service. Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 421 (2003). Thus, hypothetically, a humorous word play
on a famous name-for example, Abercrombie's Finch for a bird seed purveyor-
could be held to dilute the mark (in this case of Abercrombie and Fitch) by playing
off of it, even if no consumer would be misled into believing that both stores sold
clothes, or bird food, or indeed had any relationship to one another. As the United
States Supreme Court noted in a recent decision, this is a form of legal protection
(which had been offered prior to the federal act by some states) that does not proceed
either from earlier common law or from any interest in protecting consumers. Id. at
429. The Court somewhat limited the reach of the dilution provisions by interpreting
the statute to require at least circumstantial evidence of actual harm to the senior
mark. Id. at 434.
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one that reaches both federal and state activity, is plausible, its
recognition would bring order to the sprawl in intellectual property
rights, and stabilize the balance between incentives and access along
more intelligible lines.
Important recent legal scholarship has looked to the Constitution
for principles to discipline the creation of intellectual property rights.
Some of it has examined the Intellectual Property Clause as the
likeliest source of substantive constraints.4 9 A few commentators
broadened the exploration by turning their attention to ways in which
the First Amendment alone, or interacting with the Intellectual
Property Clause, provides an understanding of the limits on
intellectual property." Thus far in these various discussions, the
subject of the constitutional status of the public domain has remained
undeveloped.
This Article, therefore, takes up that issue directly. It does so, in a
sense, by invitation of the Supreme Court, which has at various times
dropped broad dicta into its opinions assuming that it would be
unconstitutional to propertize some forms of speech goods such as
ideas or facts.51 This inquiry asks how seriously that dicta should be
taken, on what grounds such dicta might rest, and what might be
contained in a constitutionally-defined public domain. To put it
differently, is there a right under the Constitution to have something
to say? Do individuals have some rights to further their own
expressive, intellectual, and innovative goals by utilizing categories or
kinds of speech goods without being obliged to seek permission from,
or payment to, an "owner" of that content?52
49. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1089, 1131-32 (1998); Gordon, supra note 35; J.H. Reichman &
Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling
Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 875
(1999); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 519
(1999).
50. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, Reconciling What the First Amendment
Forbids with What the Copyright Clause Permits: A Summary Explanation and
Review, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2003, at 225; C. Edwin Baker, First
Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 891 (2002) [hereinafter Baker,
First Amendment]; Benkler, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 35; Michael
Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-up and Breaking-up,
43 IDEA 233 (2003); Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1275 (2003); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke
L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First
Amendment Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2001); Patterson & Birch, supra note 35, at 1;
Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 Yale
L.J. 1 (2002); Yen, supra note 46.
51. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (stressing that copyright
does not protect facts); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 556-57 (1985) (same).
52. The Article, however, borrows its baseline assumption from the preceding free
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II. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAUSE
Because the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution has
been understood to permit some kinds of private rights in speech
goods, but to deny others, 3 it is the logical starting place for scholars
who are wrestling with the role and status of the public domain.
Protection for a public domain has long been integral to traditional
understandings about the meaning and purpose of copyright and
patent protection. An influential line of analysis holds that
intellectual property rights should extend only far enough, and no
farther, than needed to assure that the public obtains greater value
from the increased production of speech goods than it loses from the
limits on access and free use.54 Even where rights are granted, they
are purposely kept narrow. The practice in patent law, for example, is
to grant the inventor and her assigns the exclusive right to practice the
art, but to require that the principles underlying the invention be
made freely available for the perusal and enlightenment of the
public." As already noted, copyright law similarly creates ownership
rights only in the author's expression, leaving the ideas and facts
contained in the work in the public domain.56
speech/copyright scholarship. Its premise is that unless the commodification of
speech goods occurs under a valid exercise of the Copyright and Patent Clause power,
an intellectual property regime can be valid only if it survives scrutiny under the
standards of the Free Speech Clause. See supra note 50.
53. See supra notes 17-23, 41-45 and accompanying text.
54. See Thomas Babington, Lord Macaulay, A Speech Delivered in the House of
Commons on the 5th of February, 1841, in Speeches by Lord Macaulay with his
Minute on Indian Education 156, 162 (G.M. Young ed., 1935) [hereinafter Macaulay,
Speech on the 5th of February, 1841]. Macaulay felt that "monopoly [was] an evil"
and argued that "[f]or the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil
ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good."
Id.; see also Kaplan, Copyright Law, supra note 14, at 7 (expressing doubt that very
long terms for all copyrighted works could be justified). Justice Breyer examined the
economic advantages of providing copyright protection for books. Stephen Breyer,
The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and
Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970). He determined that copyright
protection, at least for more than a very short period, did not provide book publishers
with any substantial amount of additional economic advantage, whereas abolishing
copyright protection for books would provide a measurable benefit in the form of
reduction in costs to consumers. Id. at 291-323.
55. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (2000); see also 3 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents
§ 7.01 (2003). The first patent statute passed by Congress required "a specification in
writing, containing a description, accompanied with drafts or models, and
explanations and models." Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110. The
requirement was explained in Evans v. Eaton, both as helping the public guard against
"unintentional infringement" by disclosing the nature of the protected invention, and
as enabling "an artist to make the improvement, by a reference to some known and
certain authority, to be found among the records of the office of the Secretary of
State, after the patent has run out." 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 367 (1822).
56. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). The statute makes clear that copyright
protection cannot extend to "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
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The reason for limiting copyright to expression alone can be found
in the concern articulated by influential judges, 7 legislators," and
commentators 59 that, unless the common building blocks of learning
and invention were free to all, learning and imagination would be
stifled. Lord Camden, in the famous House of Lords ruling of
Donaldson v. Beckett,' for example, penned language that was later
picked up and restated, famously, by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in
Associated Press v. International News Service.61 Lord Camden wrote:
If there be any thing in the world common to all mankind, science
and learning are in their nature publici juris, and they ought to be as
free and general as air or water.... Why did we enter into society at
all, but to enlighten one another's minds, and improve our faculties,
for the common welfare of the species?
62
operation, concept, principle, or discovery." Id. This language did not appear in the
Copyright Act prior to the 1976 iteration of the statute, but it reflects a long line of
earlier precedent. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930); Fendler v. Morosco, 171 N.E. 56 (N.Y.
1930).
57. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
58. See generally Macaulay, Speech on the 5th of February, 1841, supra note 54, at
156-73 (speaking in response to a proposed bill that would extend the term of
copyright). In the debate over the extension of the copyright term that ultimately was
passed as part of the Copyright Act of 1842, several other legislators joined Macaulay
in his concern about the effects of too expansive rights. See Seville, supra note 15, at
44-46. For example, according to Seville, Thomas Wakley "presented two petitions
from the president and council of... [the British Medical Association], expressing
anxiety that an extended term would deny the public access to cheap publications,
particularly scientific ones." Id. at 44.
59. In a letter to Edward Clarke, John Locke in particular protested the claim of
property rights in old works by members of the Stationers' Company. Letter from
John Locke to Edward Clarke (Jan. 2, 1693), in The Correspondence of John Locke
and Edward Clarke 366-68 (Benjamin Rand ed., 1927). "[W]hat right," he wrote,
"can anyone pretend to have to the writings of one who lived a thousand years ago."
Id. at 367.
The Marquis de Condorcet, forefather of French copyright law, at one time
reportedly preferred government subsidies to living authors and opposed the idea of
privatizing intellectual property. Calvin D. Peeler, From the Providence of Kings to
Copyrighted Things (and French Moral Rights), 9 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 423, 430-
31(1999).
60. Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property, 17 Parl. Hist.
Eng. 953, 992-1001 (1774) (remarks of Lord Camden regarding Donaldson v. Beckett,
1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774)). As already noted, Donaldson held that copyright was
purely a creature of statute and that no common law property rights in expression
survived the expiration of the statutory term of protection. See supra note 24.
61. 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The general rule of law is,
that the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions,
and ideas-become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to
common use.").
62. 17 Parl. Hist. Eng. at 999 (opinion of Lord Camden). Examples of similar
statements are scattered throughout copyright jurisprudence and scholarship. Lord
Mansfield, grappling with the problem of just what aspects of maps and charts were
copyrightable, cautioned that courts "must take care to guard against two extremes
equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the
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This refrain recurred in various ways in the writings of numerous
others who shaped the early law in this field.63 One noted scholar
points out that Enlightenment figures in both England and the
continent "held unlimited literary property to be unjust because ideas
belonged to everyone."'  The reason for "severely limited" forms of
intellectual property was the widely shared belief that ownership of
basic speech goods, like ideas, was a kind of "monopoly over a body
of knowledge that should be for the common good" which was
detrimental to the public welfare.65
Because leading thinkers of the Enlightenment believed strongly in
limitations on the kinds of speech goods in which intellectual property
rights could be granted, one might reasonably have expected the
Copyright and Patent Clause to explicitly contain some reasonably
complete theory of the public domain. Unfortunately, the problem
cannot be solved so easily. Although the "common law" of copyright
is rife with statements about the public domain, ambiguities exist that
create real doubt about the ability to derive a general theory of the
public domain solely from the Intellectual Property Clause.
First of all, the Clause itself does not address the issue, except by
providing for a limited form of protection. Nor does the legislative
service of the community, may not be... deprived of improvements, nor the progress
of the arts be retarded." Sayre v. Moore (1785), quoted in Cary v. Longman, 102 Eng.
Rep. 139, 140 n.(b) (K.B. 1801). On this side of the Atlantic, Justice Story in his great
work Equity Jurisprudence makes a distinction in literary works between that which
"belongs to the exclusive labors of a single mind," and those things that are "common
sources of the materials of the knowledge, used by all." 2 Joseph Story,
Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered in England and America §
940 (8th ed. 1861). The clear implication is that only the first can become intellectual
property. See also Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 249-50 (K.B. 1769) (opinion of
Yates, J.) (stating that if copyright were made perpetual, it would cut against the
important social objective of encouraging learning). The majority of judges in Millar
disagreed with Yates, and ruled that the common law could be used to create
"permanent" copyrights. Id. at 258-62. This position was rejected ultimately by the
House of Lords in Donaldson. 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 846-47.
63. For a history of the development of the concept of the public domain, see
Rose, supra note 15. Rose points out that public domain discourse in the eighteenth
century was very undeveloped. Id. at 86-87. In the United States, in the early part of
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court agreed that, even if a work were
copyrighted, its content "ordinarily [is] publici juris." Int'l News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918); see also Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (E.D.
Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) ("By the publication of [her] book, the creations of the genius
and imagination of the author have become as much public property as those of
Homer or Cervantes. [Uncle Tom and Topsy are as much publici juris as Don
Quixote and Sancho Panza] .... All that now remains is the copyright of her book;
the exclusive right to print, reprint and vend it .... "). In a recent article on the public
domain, scholar Mark Rose argues that the public domain discourse in the eighteenth
century was very underdeveloped. See Rose, supra note 15, at 86-87.
64. Roger Chartier, The Order of Books: Readers, Authors, and Libraries in
Europe Between the Fourteenth and Eighteenth Centuries 35-36 (Lydia G. Cochrane
trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1994).
65. Id. at 36.
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history of the provision indicate that the framers of the Constitution
articulated a particular position on the size and scope of, or even the
need for, a speech commons.66 The language used in the Clause
indirectly suggests some notion of bounded property rights. It limits
the duration of federal patents and copyrights to something short of
perpetuity, and specifies that a work must be that of an "author" to be
copyrightable (that is to say, it must be work that is original),67 and
must be in the form of a writing (that is, in some fixed and stable
form).6" This language could be read as limiting the commodification
of speech goods to material that meets these criteria, leaving all else in
the public domain. This interpretation, however, ignores a long
history of ambiguity about congressional power in this area, as well as
a willingness to accept other forms of property rights in speech goods
at both the federal and state levels.69
66. It is generally agreed that the direct legislative history of the Intellectual
Property Clause provides little insight into the intent of the drafters, other than to
indicate a desire to provide uniformity among the states. See, e.g., Oscar Cargill &
Patrick A. Moran, Copyright Duration v. The Constitution, 17 Wayne L. Rev. 917, 920
(1971) (mentioning the lack of records, but noting a desire for uniformity); Karl
Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 Geo.
L.J. 109, 114 (1929) (noting that no minutes refer to the Clause or any debate in the
Constitutional Convention); The Federalist No. 43 (James Madison) (noting the
desire for national uniformity and stating that the public good is served by the benefit
of patents and copyrights to authors and inventors). L. Ray Patterson, in his writings
on the history of the Intellectual Property Clause, says that the Clause traces back
directly to the Statute of Anne and was intended to serve the same purposes,
including the protection of the public domain. L. Ray. Patterson, Understanding the
Copyright Clause, 47 J. Copyright Soc'y USA 365, 374-75 (2000) [hereinafter
Patterson, Understanding]; see also L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in
1791: An Essay, 52 Emory L.J. 909 (2003). Patterson arrives at this conclusion in part
based on inferences from the language of the Statute of Anne, Patterson,
Understanding, supra, and in part based on the final decision in Donaldson v. Beckett,
which refused to continue common law copyright protection for works once statutory
copyright ended. Id. at 382. This decision was handed down by the House of Lords in
1774, thirteen years before the drafting of the Intellectual Property Clause. Id.
67. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991) ("The originality requirement articulated in the Trade-Mark
Cases and Burrow-Giles remains the touchstone of copyright protection today. It is
the very 'premise of copyright law."' (citation omitted)). Originality, in the copyright
context, means both that the work must have originated with the author (rather than
being copied by her from somewhere else) and that it display some modest level of
novelty. Id. at 340 ("The constitutional requirement necessitates independent creation
plus a modicum of creativity.").
68. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
69. The Supreme Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 165-67 (1989), lists a series of presumptively valid forms of intellectual
property created by state law and apparently wholly compatible in its view of the
Constitution. As Professor Jaszi points out, the argument for restricting intellectual
property because of constitutional limits on congressional power falters when faced
with the reality that states, under existing precedent, have vast power to create new
rights. See Jaszi, supra note 30, at 604-06. "[I]f, as a constitutional matter, one
tolerates state law protection for unfixed sound recordings, it would seem perverse to
rule out the creation of a federal scheme with the same effect." Id. at 604-05.
2004] ONE VIEW OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
As to the issue of ambiguity, two hundred years after the earliest
federal copyright and patent laws, courts and scholars still do not
agree whether Congress can rely on its other enumerated powers to
create forms of intellectual property not permitted under the
Copyright and Patent Clause.7" Additionally, the extent to which the
Constitution preempts states from using their own powers to fill
perceived gaps in intellectual property law is far from clear.7 During
the time of the framers, at least one form of state law intellectual
property -trademark-was well-recognized.72  Trademark has
continued to be protected by the states, and eventually also by
Congress.73  Other state and federal protections for intangible
products of the mind have been gradually added since the adoption of
the Constitution, 4 with little to suggest that some underlying theory of
the public domain, inhering in the Intellectual Property Clause,
significantly limits that process.
The extent of congressional power to create new intellectual
property rights outside of copyright and patent first came into
question in the nineteenth century, but the resolution of the issue was
far from straightforward. In the Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme
Court held that Congress could not rely on the Intellectual Property
70. See infra notes 75-104 and accompanying text. But see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 234 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress may not use its
powers to create copyright interests that do not comply with the limited time
provisions of the "Copyright/Patent Clause").
71. Compare Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973) (holding that a state
is entitled to protect sound recordings where Congress, in its exercise of its copyright
powers, has declined to do so), with Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 141 and Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) (holding that when something is
unprotected by copyright or patent, a state may not prohibit others from copying it).
72. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879); see also William H.
Browne, A Treatise on the Law of Trade-Marks 1-14 (2d ed. 1885); supra note 17.
The Supreme Court noted in 1879 that:
The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or
property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use
by all other persons, has been long recognized by the common law and the
chancery courts of England and of this country, and by the statutes of some
of the States.... This exclusive right was not created by the act of Congress,
and does not now depend upon it for its enforcement. The whole system of
trade-mark property and the civil remedies for its protection existed long
anterior to that act, and have remained in full force since its passage.
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92.
73. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
74. To give some examples, common law copyright has been held under certain
circumstances to be capable of protecting conversations and oral presentations, Estate
of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 1968), and to the use of
confidential information, Prince Albert v. Strange, 64 Eng. Rep. 293, 302 (V.C. 1849).
Cf Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (recognizing a theory of
misappropriation to protect facts in a news story). For a discussion of these
developments, see Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note 15, at 696-712.
Another example is the creation of publicity rights. See supra note 27.
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Clause to regulate trademarks. 75 Nevertheless, the opinion strongly
suggested that, were the legislation addressed solely to interstate
transactions, the Commerce Clause might supply authority for such
legislation.76 Subsequently, federal trademark law was enacted under
the Commerce Clause power, and thus far the Supreme Court has said
nothing that casts doubt on the propriety of that exercise of legislative
authority.77 Furthermore, the Trade-Mark Cases clearly assumed that
whatever Congress could or could not do, the states could certainly
protect trademarks.78 Thus, although some boundaries protective of
the public domain may be set by the Intellectual Property Clause,
their scope and nature remain somewhat nebulous-particularly
where the matter at issue falls outside the realm of patents and
copyrights.
The point is demonstrated by the number of times that the Court
historically has approved direct or indirect commodification of speech
goods using a vehicle other than copyright or patent law. In 1918, for
example, the Court recognized a limited property interest in factual
material, using as its mechanism the tort of misappropriation.79 In
International News Service v. Associated Press, the Court explicitly
acknowledged that statutory copyright, which the Associated Press
had not acquired for its wire copy,8" would have protected only the
expression used to tell the stories, and not the factual material
contained in the plaintiff's work.81 The majority nonetheless found
that if a wire service gathered the facts for its own news copy from
75. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93-94.
76. Id. at 95. The Court found that the trademark statute in question was not
limited to interstate commerce, but left open the question of whether it would
properly fall under the commerce power of Congress if it were so limited. Id.
77. Following the decision in the Trade-Mark Cases, id., several revised iterations
of federal trademark legislation were enacted by Congress. The statute in effect
today, commonly known as the Lanham Act, was passed in 1946 and became effective
the following year. Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 489, ch. 540, 60 Stat.
427 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Roger E. Schechter &
John R. Thomas, Intellectual Property: The Law of Copyrights, Patents and
Trademarks 544-46 (2003).
78. The Court noted that recognition of trademarks had a long history at common
law and in the statutes of some states.
As the property in trade-marks and the right to their exclusive use rest on
the laws of the States, and, like the great body of the rights of person and of
property, depend on them for security and protection, the power of
Congress to legislate on the subject, to establish the conditions on which
these rights shall be enjoyed and exercised, the period of their duration, and
the legal remedies for their enforcement, if such power exist at all, must be
found in the Constitution of the United States, which is the source of all the
powers that Congress can lawfully exercise.
100 U.S. at 93.
79. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
80. Id. at 233.
81. The Court noted that this point was conceded by International News Service.
Id. It is discussed at greater length by Justice Brandeis in his dissent. Id. at 254-55
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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stories prepared and distributed by a competing service, it engaged in
a sanctionable unfair trade practice.' Although the decision has been
much criticized in subsequent decades, it continues to be cited
approvingly in other opinions.83 The Court has since followed the
path taken in International News Service and accepted as valid several
other bodies of law that treat content as property or quasi-property,
including trade secrecy,84 sound captured on phonorecordings,85 and
information about celebrities. 6 The Justices in each of these cases did
not find that states were preempted by the Constitution from
recognizing novel rights, 7 or that these enclosures poached upon
aspects of a public domain dictated by the Intellectual Property
Clause.
Even when a clear opportunity arose for the Court to clarify
whether the logic of the Intellectual Property Clause required some
kinds of speech goods to remain in the public domain, the Justices did
not follow through. The opinion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.88 rejected the sweat-of-the-brow theory that
had been used to provide copyright coverage for the contents of
factual compilations. 9  Several federal circuits had previously
protected copyright holders against the taking of facts from their
compilations to protect the value of the labor expended in gathering
the material.9" Facts, objected the Supreme Court, are not original
works of authorship9" and cannot be copyrighted-therefore, they can
be "copied at will."92 Unfortunately, the Court was silent on a key
82. Id. at 242-45.
83. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (recognizing that
the Wall Street Journal has a property right in raw information gathered by its
reporters); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (holding that a state is
entitled to protect sound recordings where Congress, in its exercise of its copyright
powers, declined to do so).
84. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
85. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
86. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1976).
87. Occasionally, the Court would strike down a state intellectual property law on
preemption grounds because it conflicted with the federal scheme for protecting
copyrights and patents. There have not been many such cases, however, and even
fewer successful ones. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141 (1989) (holding that a state law prohibiting plug mold copies of unpatented
boat hull designs was preempted); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964) (holding that a state may not protect the design of a pole lamp that is not
entitled to a patent); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964)
(holding that state law cannot forbid the copying of a useful object unprotected by
patent law). But see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (holding
that patent law does not preempt state trade secrets protection); Goldstein, 412 U.S.
546 (holding that a state may protect a writing, or in this case, a sound recording,
when federal copyright law declines to do so).
88. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 352-54.
91. Id. at 347-48.
92. Id. at 350.
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issue. Was the problem in Feist that the objective (the protection of
facts) was unconstitutional, or merely that the mechanism (copyright)
was wrong? In the latter case, Congress could rely on the Commerce
Clause, or the states could rely on the law of misappropriation to
remedy the problem.93 The ambiguity in Feist has encouraged efforts
to create new intellectual property rights-for example, it resulted in
several years of effort by Congress to enact database legislation under
its Commerce Clause power.94
So far, the clearest recognition by the Court that some absolute
barrier against proliferating intellectual property rights may reside in
the Copyright and Patent Clause can be found in the Court's recent
decision, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.95 Dastar
involved a "reverse passing off" claim under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.9 6 The defendant, Dastar, decided to reproduce, edit,
and reissue a set of public domain videotapes on World War 11." The
set was packaged and distributed by Dastar under its own name
without any mention of the orginators of the television series from
which they were drawn-wrongly suggesting, the claimants argued,
that Dastar was the author of the work.98 The Court rejected the
reverse passing off claim on the ground that, as long as Dastar was the
actual source of the physical goods, it did not mislead the public about
their "origins" within the meaning of section 43(a).99  More
importantly for purposes of this Article, the Court also noted that
once the term of the copyright ran out, Congress would have no
93. The lack of clarity is surprising, since Justice O'Connor, who wrote the
opinion for Feist, had previously penned dicta in Harper & Row suggesting that there
was an absolute prohibition against commodifying facts. Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985). Somewhat similar ambiguity can be
found elsewhere. For example, in Graham v. John Deere Co., Justice Clark, writing
for the Court, said: "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free
access to materials already available." 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). As in Feist, whether or
not such a result could be reached by other means is not specified.
94. See supra note 28. Professor Jaszi has criticized Feist on similar grounds as I
do in this Article. After making the best case for reading Feist as a bar on using
congressional power to give intellectual property protection to facts, he then cautions:
The difficulty with the preceding conclusion ... is that the Supreme Court
does not say, or at least does not say very emphatically, that the demarcation
of the public domain is what is at stake in Feist. To claim that it is,
unfortunately, represents a mere interpretation of the decision, no matter
how plausible or attractive it may be. Given the emphasis placed on the
importance of enriching the public domain in traditional copyright policy
discourse, one might have expected more from the Court in Feist than it
actually delivered.
Jaszi, supra note 30, at 605-06.
95. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
96. Id. at 27 n.1.
97. Id. at 26-27.
98. Id. at 31.
99. Id. at 38.
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alternative source of power under the Commerce Clause to require
Dastar to identify the author of a public domain work. °0 Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court, found that once a work of authorship
goes into the public domain, it can be copied at will and used freely
with no further obligation toward the author or prior owners of the
work. ' Allowing Congress to use the Lanham Act to create rights in
public domain works, wholly or partially equivalent to those under
copyright, he asserted, would have the impermissible effect of
rendering such property interests perpetual. 02
Thus, one can say with fair confidence that copyrighted expression
must move into the public domain at some point. Congress cannot
avoid this result by turning to its other powers to extend some or all
expired copyright protections. Dastar does not, of course, answer
whether there are comparable limits on Congress's power to create
novel interests that do not fall under the umbrella of copyright.0 3
Significantly, the limits imposed by the Intellectual Property Clause
on state law enclosures of the public domain are also doubtful. Thus,
if the Supreme Court ruled that the limits in the Intellectual Property
Clause prevent Congress from enacting a federal right of publicity
statute, it would by no means be clear that if state laws supplied such
rights, they would "conflict" with federal policy.
This moves us on to the foggy terrain of preemption. States may be
preempted by federal statute, and thus prevented from enacting laws
100. Id. at 33. Rights under the Lanham Act and trademark rights generally are
not time-limited in the same way as copyrights. A trademark, for example, survives as
long as it continues to be used. Schechter & Thomas, supra note 77, at 757.
The suit also alleged that Dastar had infringed a subsisting copyright in the book on
which the original television series was itself based. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 28 n.2.
This part of the case was not raised in the petition for certiorari, and was not decided
by the Court. Id. It was, however, alluded to in the opinion. Id. at 34-35.
101. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34-35.
102. Id. The only other case to consider a claim to perpetual copyright is Wheaton
v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). That case, however, did not turn on the
demands of the public domain, but rather on the fact that neither the state of
Pennsylvania nor the federal copyright statute recognized the possibility of a
perpetual common law copyright in a published writing. Id. at 657-58.
103. For example, something not fixed in tangible form may be uncopyrightable
because it does not qualify as a "writing" for purposes of the Intellectual Property
Clause. The question would then be whether a statute could be drafted under the
commerce power to protect, say, a famous person's extemporaneous remarks or an
actor's improvisation. Harper & Row suggests that there are other limits on what can
be considered intellectual property, but it is unclear whether those limits are
attributable to the Intellectual Property Clause itself. See Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985). The Court discussed copyright
doctrines that avoid conflicts with freedom of speech. Id. at 555-56. Although the
opinion is not altogether clear on the issue, the more persuasive reading seems to be
that these accommodations are demanded by the First Amendment rather than by the
Intellectual Property Clause. See id; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217-24
(2003). Thus, Harper & Row and Eldred are discussed in the next section of this
Article dealing with the Freedom of Speech and Press Clauses. See infra notes 128-37
and accompanying text.
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to control the public domain under statutory preemption." They may
also be prevented from acting under Supremacy Clause-based
preemption where (1) Congress has expressly denied them that right,
(2) an actual conflict arises between federal and state law, or (3) a
state encroaches onto territory that is under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal government. 05 Preemption analysis in the intellectual
property context, however, is so confusing, and successful claims are
sufficiently rare that a cautious observer would hesitate to predict that
the doctrine would do much to cut off the expansion or creation of
new state intellectual property law.1"6
In summary, the expectation that the Intellectual Property Clause
will be the primary source of protection for a meaningful public
domain is compelling in the abstract.0 7 Actual legislative and judicial
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (preemption provision of the Copyright Act of
1976).
105. For examples of successful preemption cases, see Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film
Corp., 189 F.3d 377 (3rd Cir. 1999); U.S. ex rel. Berge v. Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama, 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1997); Maljack Productions, Inc. v.
Good Times Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 1996); Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 674-79 (7th Cir. 1986).
106. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)
(preempting state protection of unpatented designs); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (same); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S.
234 (1964) (same). But see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (allowing state
to protect expression unprotected by Congress under copyright law). A number of
scholars have argued that preemption should be more vigorously used to limit
incursions into the public domain by states. See Lange, Recognizing, supra note 35, at
173-74 (urging preemption to be used "readily, not grudgingly"); David Shipley,
Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and Federal
Preemption, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 673 (1981) (arguing that publicity rights should be
considered preempted). Courts have generally shown little enthusiasm for such an
approach. Normally, if a state right is deemed to protect some "extra element" not
the subject of copyright, courts will refuse to apply preemption. See, e.g., ProCD v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics
of Internet Norms, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1257 (1998) (finding it unlikely that courts
would apply preemption to contract law because it supplies the necessary extra
element). When courts do find common law intellectual property rights preempted,
usually the right conflicts with interests conveyed by statutory copyright. See, e.g.,
NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding partial preemption of
state misappropriation law because it was applied to facts acquired from copyrighted,
publicly telecast basketball games); Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d 663 (preempting the
publicity right claims of players where assertion of that right would interfere with a
copyright owner's ability to broadcast a copyrighted recording of the games). But see
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding no preemption of
a right of publicity claim, and suggesting that preemption would play a role only if
Midler wanted exclusive rights to the song in question as part of her claim); Wendt v.
Host Int'l, Inc., 50 F.3d 18 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) (refusing to
find preemption in a publicity rights case because of an extra element in a case where
the claim arguably conflicted with rights of copyright owners).
107. See, e.g., Benkler, Constitutional Bounds, supra note 28 at 538, 541-52;
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy's Approach to Information Products: Muscling
Copyright and Patent into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 195, 230; Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative
Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000
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practices'018 and much scholarship, 19 however, suggest the need for
support from other constitutional sources. For that reason, this
discussion will now turn to the other possible source of a mandatory
public domain, the First Amendment. It does so in the face of a
lingering reluctance by courts,110 as well as by many intellectual
property scholars,"' to recognize that the First Amendment is a
pertinent source of learning about the permissible scope of intellectual
property rules.
III. CAN SPEECH BE FREE WITHOUT A PUBLIC DOMAIN?
One reason that the case for a mandatory commons under free
speech has received relatively little explicit attention in intellectual
property circles is, I believe, a result of an accident of history. The
intellectual compartmentalization in legal scholarship leaves those
primarily interested in the First Amendment largely unaware of policy
U. Ill. L. Rev. 1119; Malla Pollack, The Owned Public Domain: The Constitutional
Right Not to Be Excluded- Or the Supreme Court Chose the Right Breakfast Cereal in
Kellogg v. National Biscuit Co., 22 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 265 (2000). In their
very interesting and thoughtful article, Professor Patterson and Judge Birch also
argue that the Copyright Clause itself protects access to the public domain, as well as
some level of access to copyrighted works. Patterson & Birch, supra note 35.
108. See, e.g., Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, sec. 3,
109 Stat. 985, 985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)); Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, sec. 302, §§ 901-914, 98 Stat. 3335,
3347-56 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914). For judicial opinions on the
topic, see cases cited in supra note 103.
109. Professor Jane Ginsburg has argued both that Congress can expand
intellectual property protection under the Copyright and Patent Clause by exercising
its discretion to redefine the "limiting" terms in the Clause, and that it can also use
the Commerce Clause power to offer protections to "conduct different from that at
issue in patent and copyright laws." Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and
Other Protection of Works of Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 Colum.
L. Rev. 338, 367-84 (1992) [hereinafter Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?]; see also Pamela
Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckleshaus and Carpenter Signal a
Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 Cath. U. L. Rev. 365 (1989)
(expressing concern that Supreme Court decisions in Carpenter v. United States, 484
U.S. 19 (1987), and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984), appeared to open
the way to treating factual information as property). For arguments that the Supreme
Court has also left considerable scope to the states to create new intellectual property
rights, see Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?, supra, at 353-67; Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning
Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 Va. L. Rev. 149,
154 (1992); Jaszi, supra note 30, at 602-05.
110. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1985);
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), affd sub. nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003); Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d
1171, 1179-82 (5th Cir. 1980). But see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
111. For examples of articles on intellectual property rights in databases that make
little mention of possible First Amendment impediments, see Bender, supra note 28;
Ginsburg, Sui Generis Protection, supra note 28; J.H. Reichman and Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 51 (1997). But see
Green, supra note 28.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
debates raging in intellectual property, and many intellectual property
scholars have historically thought little, or at least have not thought
deeply, about the implications of the First Amendment for
information policy. In the main, those who have pioneered the
bridging of this gap l"' have focused largely on the ways that specific
aspects of copyright doctrine, such as the scope of fair use,'13 should
be shaped to take proper account of the apparently inconsistent
requirement that government not regulate speech.114 Others have
taken a more general cut at the copyright/free speech dichotomy, 5
and in so doing, some have touched on the subject of the public
domain. But even this discussion has proceeded at a high level of
generality, dictated largely by the authors' particular theoretical
understanding of the First Amendment.116 This Article is not driven
by a particular theory, but instead asks what material in First
Amendment jurisprudence as a whole bears on whether some core
body of speech goods is required to be freely available for the use of
would-be speakers."1 7 There are many reasons to hypothesize that this
112. See, e.g., Baker, First Amendment, supra note 50; Benkler, Constitutional
Bounds, supra note 28; Benkler, Free as the Air, supra note 1; Benkler, Through the
Looking Glass, supra note 35; Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech:
Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 283 (1979);
Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970);
Netanel, supra note 50; Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1970);
Patterson & Birch, supra note 35; Rubenfeld, supra note 50; Zimmerman,
Information as Speech, supra note 15,
113. See, e.g., Gary L. Francione, Facing The Nation: The Standards for Copyright,
Infringement, and Fair Use of Factual Works, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 519 (1986); David E.
Shipley, Conflicts Between Copyright and the First Amendment After Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 1986 BYU L. Rev. 983.
114. See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 112; Goldstein, supra note 112; Nimmer, supra
note 112.
115. See, e.g., Baker, First Amendment, supra note 50; Netanel, supra note 50;
Rubenfeld, supra note 50; Van Alstyne, supra note 50.
116. For an argument based on a view of the First Amendment as a protection of
human autonomy, see Baker, First Amendment, supra note 50, at 897-99 and Benkler,
Constitutional Bounds, supra note 28, at 561-62. For an argument proceeding from an
interpretation of the First Amendment as a way to ensure that citizens can participate
in democratic self-governance, see id. at 558-61.
117. Benkler's most recent article on the First Amendment and intellectual
property, Benkler, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 35, refers to the public
domain in its title, but does not take the approach used here. Rather, the article
works back from the autonomy and civil democratic participation perspectives to
make a case that the term extension in Eldred; the provisions in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000), that prohibit discussion of
code-breaking; and the proposed protection of databases all pose free speech
problems. This Article does not discuss the public domain as an intellectual construct,
nor does it attempt to suggest any of its discernible contours. Patterson and Birch,
too, do not directly address the existence of a mandatory public domain, although
they do make an argument that free speech presupposes access to, and the ability to
use, information. Patterson & Birch, supra note 35, at 6, 10, 20. They ground this
argument in a First Amendment "right to know."
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mandatory commons is part of what is meant by freedom of speech,
and this section will begin by attempting to explain why this should be
so.
A. Why the First Amendment Should Be Understood to Require a
Mandatory Public Domain
It can scarcely be controversial to suggest that without the ability to
use at least the basic building blocks of speech (words, ideas,
hypotheses, facts, symbols with meaning), the First Amendment could
guarantee a right to freedom of speech, but would not reasonably
ensure that anyone could exercise it." 8 A number of scholars have
persuasively shown that even more complex sorts of content, such as
actual expression borrowed from other people's work, can be essential
raw material without which some aspects of an individual's own
thoughts, allegiances, and observations cannot be fully conveyed to
others. 19 Without this raw material, communication would be limited
Part of the problem is that the concentration on the right to print and speak,
rather than to read and hear, gives the impression that copyright is
consistent with, and indeed implements, the right of free speech. This view
is sound, but too limited, for it ignores what is the essence of free speech
rights-the right to know-if it is to be meaningful. This follows from the
fact that to censor is to control what one can know, that is, to control access,
to information, knowledge and learning, which is precisely what the First
Amendment protects against.
Id. at 20. A discussion of the right to know theory as a possible basis for a mandatory
public domain can be found in Part III.C.1, infra.
118. A few well-recognized exceptions to the general rule, in addition to copyright,
should be acknowledged. For example, we might be restrained from communicating
content that poses an immediate and imminent danger to public safety. See Near v.
Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Also, under some circumstances, it is
permissible to enter into an enforceable agreement to keep information secret. This
is the basis of trade secrecy law. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470
(1974). Secrecy agreements have also been upheld to protect national security
information and personal information. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663
(1991); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
119. See, e.g., Baker, First Amendment, supra note 50, at 899-900; Benkler, Free as
the Air, supra note 1, at 362-63. This argument found its way into a major copyright
decision in the Second Circuit. In New Era Publications International, ApS v. Carol
Publishing Group, the court wrote:
[E]ven passages used for their expression are intended to convey the
author's perception of Hubbard's hypocrisy and pomposity, qualities that
may best (or only) be revealed through direct quotation. The book "is not
merely the product of 'the facile use of the scissors."' [W]hile a few of these
[quotations] may arguably come close to the line separating critical study
from appropriation, most do not. Indeed, even this borderline use appears
to serve the author's purpose by juxtaposing the grandiose expression of the
quotations with the banal (to the author) material contained in the body of
the chapter.
904 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). But see Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 423-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.
1987). In the district court case, Judge Pierre Leval argued that direct quotes from
unpublished works could constitute fair use if they served the second author's
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to a few primitive gestures, and would be useful for little beyond
conveying our intent to satisfy our most pressing personal needs. A
constitutional guarantee of free speech that promised to protect little
more than our right to mumble meaningless sounds or scribble
random lines on a piece of paper would be an empty concept. Speech
requires content to be meaningful. This includes some ability to
acquire such content and certainly the privilege of using it.
If an existing legal regime were to award ownership of all speech
inputs to private parties who could charge for them, or select who can
use them and how, we would not be reduced entirely to mumbles and
scribbles because we could bargain our way to some measure of access
to and use of content. But the tools available to any individual person
for communicating would be far more circumscribed than if the
speech inputs she required were free of restraints or costs. In any
event, it would be difficult to characterize a scheme that centralizes
control over facts and ideas, or uncopyrighted expression, in the hands
of "owners" as one that promotes free speech.
Scholars argue endlessly over what theory best represents the
function of the First Amendment. Some conceive of this function as
one designed to protect and promote human autonomy; for others,
the purpose is to facilitate participation in self-governance, or as a
servant to some instrumental end. 2 ° But each of these theories has in
common an assumption that some quantum of speech goods will be
freely available to citizens from which to borrow, cobble together, or
invent the furnishings of their minds and the content of their
communications to others. '21 Thus, one might call a First Amendment
public domain "pre-theoretical" because it is so intertwined with the
possibility of speaking for any purpose that no theory of the First
Amendment could be implemented without it.
An autonomy theorist would presumably be most in need of a
broad public domain, a background norm that assumes unconstrained
expressive needs. Id. at 423-24.
120. One possibility is that the Free Speech Clause facilitates the formation of
shared values in the community. Paul D. Carrington, Our Imperial First Amendment,
34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1167, 1177-79 (2001); Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without
Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 580 (1991);
see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 26-32
(1998).
121. Compare C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political
Expenditures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 646 (1982)
(arguing that the Free Speech Clause primarily protects the rights of autonomous
individuals in self-expression), with Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971) (arguing that free speech protection
was designed to protect the political process and covers only speech that deals
explicitly with political issues), and Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130
U. Pa. L. Rev. 591 (1982) (arguing that the First Amendment was primarily designed
to foster a marketplace of ideas so that individuals would have access to the
intellectual tools that could give them control over their destinies).
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use of most speech goods. Individual self-realization would be
seriously hampered if people could not draw on a broad array of
material, largely without constraints, for whatever in their judgment
seemed worth learning or utilizing in discourse.123
A self-governance understanding of the Free Speech Clause would
be equally difficult to realize if it were forced to co-exist with a legal
regime that allowed unlimited commodification of the raw materials
of speech. 124 Although, in theory, the democratic governance position
might require less content in its public domain (depending on how
broadly or narrowly one conceives of what is meant by a public issue
or political decision making), 125 discussion of public issues and
development of one's capacity to engage in self-governance
necessitate the use of speech goods.
Thus, however one approaches free speech, simply imagining a
regime in which it is possible for many or all intellectual resources to
be owned and controlled is to imagine a world where the practice of
"free speech" would be shorn of most of its meaning and much of its
122. As will be discussed in a later section, some constraints are compatible even
with an autonomy-driven First Amendment. Even the most adamant defender of the
autonomy hypothesis will usually concede that the individual's decision to
communicate using material that is not publicly known could be restricted on those
rare occasions where a profoundly important interest of the larger society demanded
it. See cases cited in note 118, supra; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 726 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (interest in secrecy to protect national
security may be strong enough on some occasions to warrant a prior restraint); United
States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (same). Whether
similar reasoning should ever justify limiting the use of material not held in secret and
learned of from publicly available sources is at least a question. In Progressive, the
material sought to be restrained was drawn entirely from such publicly available
sources as encyclopedias. Id. at 993.
123. Edwin Baker, who takes a strong pro-autonomy view of the Free Speech
Clause, argues in a recent article on free speech and copyright that individual
speakers have a First Amendment right to use even copyrighted expression at will for
noncommercial purposes. Baker, First Amendment, supra note 50, at 900-04. This is
an interesting argument in light of the number of disputes in recent years that involve
copying by individuals for their private use. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2001); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
124. As Yochai Benkler has pointed out, property rights in speech goods conflict
with the goal of enabling democratic self-governance, not only because "they
affect... how much information is exchanged in our public conversations, but more
importantly who gets to say what to whom, and who decides these questions."
Benkler, Constitutional Bounds, supra note 28, at 561. He also notes: "For a
community to be democratically self-governing its members must have access to
information, this information must not be too tightly controlled by one group or
another, and constituents must be able to express their views as well as receive
information." Id. at 559.
125. Compare the broad definition used by Alexander Meiklejohn with the very
narrow one used by Bork. Compare Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 117
(1960) [hereinafter Meiklejohn, Political Freedom], and Alexander Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 255-57 [hereinafter
Meiklejohn, First Amendment], with Bork, supra note 121, at 20, 26.
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utility. Leaving aside philosophical questions about the existence and
knowability of external reality, and proceeding instead from the
common sense perspective of daily life, I cannot conceive of how
intellectual development or human interaction would proceed if we
were denied the automatic use of such inputs because what we
understand, think about, and express to others is so heavily imprinted
by what we observe, remember, read, and hear of from others.126
Consider, for example, an attempt in the year 2004 to discuss the
situation of United States troops in Iraq in a college history class.
Then imagine that the discussion could not occur until the professor
and the class first cleared rights to utilize, for example, the words and
actions of Saddam Hussein or of the former American administrator
of the country, L. Paul Bremer III, with the "owners" of that content.
Or think about being a painter who cannot use the image of a social
icon in her composition without the celebrity's permission. Or a
composer who has to negotiate for permission to use the key of C
major with its owner. Such a regime would not merely foster an
intellectual environment that is suboptimal (after all, no one has ever
claimed that constitutional rights guarantee optimal conditions for
their enjoyment), but one that is horribly impoverished, and that
subjugates the intellectual life of each person to the control of market
126. The relationship between human development and intellectual inputs
(including those in the form of speech goods) has long been recognized. The actual
development of the brain seems to be affected by the richness or poverty of a person's
experience, including interactions with other people as well as with objects. Children,
who have been deprived of normal inputs by being reared in extreme isolation, or in
the wild, in most cases do not develop normal communication skills or normal affect,
despite efforts to teach and interact with them when they are rescued. Numerous case
reports of so-called feral children, or children isolated in dungeons and the like at an
early age, are reasonably consistent on these points. The Reverend J.A.L. Singh, for
example, studied two children raised by wolves. Douglas Keith Candland, Feral
Children and Clever Animals: Reflections on Human Nature 53-68 (1993). Bishop
H. Pakenham-Walsh, who visited the wolf-children, reported of one of them:
When I saw Kamala she could speak, quite clearly and distinctly, about
thirty words; when told to say what a certain object was, she would name it,
but she never used her words in a spontaneous way. She would never, for
instance, ask for anything she wanted by naming it, but would quietly wait
till Mrs. Singh asked her, one by one, whether it was so and so she wanted,
and when the right thing was named she would nod.
Id. at 67 (quoting Pakenham-Walsh's description of Kamala from J.A.L. Singh &
R.M. Zingg, Wolf-children and Feral Man xxvi-xxvii (1939)). Pakenham-Walsh notes
that Kamala gradually learned more words, but did not develop curiosity or a sense of
humor, nor did she show much else in the way of emotional growth. Id. at 67-68.
Numerous similar stories are told, and, in many, no language development at all
occurred. See Floyd E. Bloom & Arlyne Lazerson, Brain, Mind, and Behavior 266-67
(2d ed. 1988) (recounting the story of Genie, a child reared from 20 months to 13
years of age in isolation in a small room, harnessed to a .potty chair); Jean-Marc-
Gaspard Itard, The Wild Boy of Aveyron 3 (George & Muriel Humphrey trans.,
1962) (recounting the story of a child who lived alone in the woods in France until he
was 12 or 13 years of age); see also Candland, supra (discussing studies of children
who spent their early years without human contact).
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actors.12  Admittedly, these hypotheticals ask the reader to imagine
scenarios well beyond what even the most enthusiastic advocate of
greater property rights has thus far proposed, but they do illustrate,
nonetheless, why freedom of speech must be predicated on freedom
to utilize at least a substantial amount of content free of outside
restraints. To exercise the right of free speech, one must necessarily
enjoy some considerable right to have something to say.
The argument that the Constitution protects a public domain is not,
however, entirely based on theory. Upon examination, one can find a
refrain running through both First Amendment and copyright case
law that suggests a protected commons does exist, and that it is rooted
heavily, although not necessarily exclusively, in the First Amendment.
On at least two occasions in its copyright decisions, the Supreme
Court has made explicit reference to the existence of a
constitutionally protected commons that limits what can be
commodified by copyright.
The first of these was the Harper & Row decision12 1 in 1985. The
subject was raised a second time almost twenty years later in the
Eldred case, to the same effect. 129 Harper & Row involved a dispute
over a news report on the substance of an about-to-be-published
autobiography of former President Gerald Ford. In addition to
scooping the book's most titillating content, 3° the defendant in the
case, the magazine The Nation, used about 300 actual words from the
book. The magazine argued that, because of the news value of its
127. Whether a compulsory licensing scheme, under which permission is automatic
upon payment of a fee, would be inconsistent with the First Amendment will be
discussed at length later in this piece. See infra Part III.D.3.
128. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). Other,
earlier decisions also recognized the existence of a public domain. In Baker v. Selden,
for example, the Court wrote extensively about what is and is not in the public
domain. The Court stated that if an author publishes a book without getting a patent
on the art contained in it (and patents, of course, are available only for a limited
subset of things that are useful), then the art will be deemed to have been given to the
public. 101 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1879). The Court explicated further by saying:
The copyright of a work on mathematical science cannot give to the author
an exclusive right to the methods of operation which he propounds, or to the
diagrams which he employs to explain them, so as to prevent an engineer
from using them whenever occasion requires. The very object of publishing
a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the
useful knowledge which it contains. But this object would be frustrated if
the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the
book.
Id. at 103.
129. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
130. The autobiography contained former President Ford's first explanation to the
public of his decision to pardon Richard Nixon after he stepped down from the
presidency in the wake of the Watergate scandal. Much of this information
apparently had also been provided by President Ford to a congressional committee,
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195, 205 (2d Cir. 1983),
but obviously what he would choose to say about these events in his autobiography
was not public knowledge until The Nation published its story.
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report, it enjoyed a First Amendment defense against the publisher's
claim of copyright infringement.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, refused to find such a
defense because, she noted, copyright doctrine was already shaped in
ways that took account of the limits imposed by the Speech Clause.
This is why, she wrote, copyright cannot protect facts or ideas, and
that it must allow for some degree of fair use. Justice O'Connor was
quite explicit about the role of the First Amendment:
The Second Circuit noted, correctly, that copyright's idea/expression
dichotomy "strike[s] a definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author's
expression." No author may copyright his ideas or the facts he
narrates. As this Court long ago observed: "[T]he news element-
the information respecting current events contained in the literary
production-is not the creation of the writer, but is a report of
matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is the history of the
day. ,1
31
This passage itself referred back to a long line of similar
commentary in earlier cases, all declaring a fundamental
constitutional commitment to the robust and uninhibited exchange of
ideas. 32 This was the first time, however, that the Supreme Court in a
copyright decision explicitly stated that some types of speech goods
cannot be subject to ownership.
Eldred, a case challenging the twenty-year extension of existing
copyright terms, 3 3 reiterated the rhetoric about a public domain. This
time in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court again made
reference to the fact that intellectual property rights must be limited
to avoid a conflict with the First Amendment.' Justice Ginsburg
then added that, were Congress to ignore those limitations, the right
to free speech, under which "every idea, theory, and fact in a
copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public exploitation
at the moment of publication,"'35 would be violated. The opinion
went on to explain that, while Congress may limit the right to use
131. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556 (citations omitted). Interestingly, however,
Justice O'Connor also wrote the Court's opinion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., and never mentioned any First Amendment limitations when
actually asked about the appropriateness of a copyright in facts. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
132. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556; see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 271-72 (1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). For a
later example using similar language, see Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,
520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997).
133. The statute in question, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304
(2000)), extended both new and existing copyrights. The specific challenge in Eldred,
however, was to the extension of existing copyrights. 537 U.S. at 193.
134. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20.
135. Id. at 219.
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someone else's personal expression, it is a quite different case where
"the government compels or burdens the communication of particular
facts or ideas."'36 The ability to communicate facts and ideas freely,
according to the Court, is "securely protect[ed].' 37
Looking beyond those two decisions, various members of the Court
past and present have actually made reference to speech-based
protection for the public domain in nearly two dozen opinions. All
seem to agree that once speech goods enter the public domain, their
further use may neither be punished nor restricted in any but the most
unusual circumstances. 138
The Court, however, has never set out a coherent theory of the
public domain, or done more than hint about why it supposes one to
exist. Eldred and Harper & Row contain the most detailed discussions
of the First Amendment's requirements, and they supply scarcely
more than sketches in dicta. Thus, a seeker of enlightenment, like an
ancient prophesier, must sort through the entrails of First
Amendment case law and theory for portents to help flesh out the
depth of the Court's commitment to a mandatory public domain.
Matters are further complicated by the fact that the signs do not
always point in a single direction. Despite the implicit recognition
over decades that a protected commons exists, the Court has on
occasion reached conclusions that undercut that assumption. For
example, the Court has tolerated the commodification of speech
goods under authority other than the Intellectual Property Clause.'3 9
136. Id. at 221.
137. Id. Patterson and Birch place a somewhat different interpretation on this line
of reasoning. They argue that the First Amendment and the Intellectual Property
Clause have a common origin and share a common goal of promoting speech.
Patterson & Birch, supra note 35. This conclusion is supported by Justice O'Connor's
statement in Harper & Row that copyright is the "engine of free expression." 471 U.S.
at 558.
138. In addition to Eldred and Harper & Row, which have already been discussed,
the protected status of material in the public domain is alluded to in the majority
opinions of several Supreme Court First Amendment cases. See Smith v. Doe, 538
U.S. 84, 100-01 (2003); L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S.
32, 40 (1999) (cannot restrict use of information individual already possesses); Fla.
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 538 (1989); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829, 840 (1978); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 602-03
(1978); Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1977) (per curiam); Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975). In addition, comments to the same
effect appear in numerous concurring or dissenting opinions by Justices from across
the entire ideological spectrum. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 548 (2001)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); L.A. Police Dep't, 528 U.S. at 43 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring); Landmark Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 849 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (finding that once information is in the hands of the press, republication
cannot be punished or restrained absent "overwhelming" need); Nixon, 435 U.S. at
615-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 595-96 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 646 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 401 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 89 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring).
139. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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What follows is an attempt to evaluate the consistency of First
Amendment jurisprudence with the theory of a mandatory public
domain set out above. Hopefully, this examination will both support
and illuminate the theory, and will also provide insights into the
specific nature of the posited commons.
B. The Public Domain and the Limits of History
One might first look for evidence that the First Amendment
presupposes a mandatory public domain in constitutional history. 4'
As was true of the Intellectual Property Clause, however, this avenue
provides little in the way of solid insights. To be sure, some
progenitors of the First Amendment may have understood the
necessity for a public domain to effectuate their vision of protection
for public discourse, and ensure that information, at least about
political issues, would flow unimpeded to the public. 4' But this was
not at the top of their free speech agenda; in the context of those
times, the framers were far more focused on the threat posed by
government censorship to the free flow of information than they were
on the risks posed by the imposition of proprietary controls over the
reuse in speech of content.4 ' Historians of the First Amendment
generally agree that it was driven primarily by the reaction of the
framers to Great Britain's longstanding, systematic use of seditious
libel prosecutions and prior restraints to control and suppress speech
critical of the actions of public officials.143
The anger generated by the government's use of these speech-
inhibiting devices 44 in Great Britain and the American colonies cast a
140. On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has turned to historical
understandings of the First Amendment as an interpretative aid. See N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (discussing James Madison's belief that the right
of free public discussion of public officials was "a fundamental principle of the
American form of government"); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514
U.S. 334, 358-70 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583-86 (1983); Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80 (1980).
141. James Madison, for example, once wrote: "A popular Government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people
who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives." Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9
Writings of James Madison 103 (Galliard Hunt ed., 1910).
142. This early history is discussed at greater length in Zimmerman, Information as
Speech, supra note 15, at 677-85.
143. In fact, copyright in Great Britain (prior to its first statutory incarnation) was
in its earliest iteration a central part of a censorship scheme. In return for allowing
books to be vetted and licensed by the Crown, the Stationers Company was allowed
to control who could print and sell them. Kaplan, An Unhurried View, supra note 14,
at 3-4. Benjamin Kaplan has famously written that copyright was excreted from the
"interstices" of censorship. Id.
144. A "seditious" libel was a statement tending to cast the Crown, government
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long shadow over the drafting of the Free Speech and Press Clauses.
Most of the commentary directed to the substance of free speech
protections was aimed at assuring that these devices, in particular the
device of prior restraints, could not be used at the national level.'45
There is still debate over whether, rhetoric notwithstanding, the
framers actually intended the First Amendment simply to restrict
federal power in this arena and leave speech regulation to the
authority of the states, or if some substantive content was also
intended.'46 If formal content was included, the substantive view most
widely accepted was that the government was disabled from
restricting politically distasteful viewpoints. 47 A claim that the First
Amendment from the outset also consciously embodied a clear
underlying information policy intended to fuel the ability to speak and
to engage in public or private discourse is purely speculative.
The framers were, of course, products of the Enlightenment, and
undoubtedly shared assumptions similar to those expressed by other
important thinkers of the era-figures like Milton, Spinoza, and
Burton. All of these figures expressed to greater or lesser degrees the
belief that the freedom to engage in the quest for knowledge and to
develop one's understanding was basic to any concept of the free and
autonomous individual.'48  To the extent, however, that the
relationship between law and fodder for the life of the mind was an
explicit subject of discourse and debate, that discussion most clearly
took place in the context of copyright. 49  Furthermore, even the
framing of the issue as a concern with the shape of a "public domain"
adopts modern rather than historically traditional language.
The clearest indication I have found that American constitutional
officials, or even the established Church and its representatives, into disrepute. The
first law in England against disparagement of figures in positions of state authority
dates back to 1275 A.D. See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press 6 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1985).
145. See generally id. Ironically, of course, Congress did in fact pass a law
punishing sedition early in the history of the republic. The Alien and Sedition Acts
are discussed at length in Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 274-77.
146. The history surrounding the First Amendment does not provide clear answers
to this debate, leaving commentators to speculate on the actual intentions of the
framers. See Levy, supra note 144, at 264-79; see also William T. Mayton, Seditious
Libel and the Lost Guarantee of Freedom of Expression, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 91, 117-21
(1984).
147. This history is reflected in modern case law. Any regulation of speech based
on disapproval of the content of the speech occupies a particularly disfavored
position. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323
(7th Cir. 1985), affd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
148. Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note 15, at 779-80.
149. For example, in Donaldson v. Beckett, Lord Camden insisted that science and
learning ought to be "free and general as air or water," and added, "Why did we enter
into society at all, but to enlighten one another's minds, and improve our faculties, for
the common welfare of the species?" 17 Par. Hist. Eng. 953, 999 (1774). For other
examples, see Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note 15, at 681-84.
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thinkers ever concerned themselves consciously about the context of
freedom of speech, with regard to the issue of the acquisition and use
of content, appears in an influential treatise by Tunis Wortman.
Wortman called knowledge:
[A] general fund, of which all have a right to participate: it is a
capital which has the peculiar property of increasing its stores in
proportion as they are used. We are entitled to pursue every
justifiable method of increasing our perceptions and invigorating our
faculties. We are equally entitled to communicate our information
to others.150
Unfortunately, for purposes of making historically sound claims
about the constitutional status of the public domain, Wortman was not
a framer, and his book was published almost a decade after the First
Amendment was added to the Constitution. 5' It, however, supports
and is consistent with the idea that the authors of free speech in
American law at least understood in general terms that the point of
protecting speech was to allow citizens to utilize information freely.
Certainly, there is nothing to suggest that the framers, or the tenor
of the times, bore hostility toward some notion that a mandatory
commons was an integral part of protected speech.152 It may even be
fair to suggest that so widely accepted was the notion that ideas and
facts should be freely utilizable that no one supposed it necessary to
provide for it explicitly. 53
C. Teasing a Foundation for Public Domain Theory Out of Free
Speech Doctrine
Since history is at best opaque, one must turn elsewhere for
evidence to help decide how seriously to take the dicta on the public
domain in Harper & Row and Eldred. Several lines of cases (not all of
them dealing directly with free speech) suggest themselves as sources,
and when read together, fall into a pattern highly suggestive of a First
Amendment-based mandatory public domain. 54  The most
150. Tunis Wortman, A Treatise Concerning Political Enquiry and the Liberty of
the Press 140-41 (DaCapo Press 1970) (1800).
151. Id.
152. Some might argue that the existence of the Intellectual Property Clause
indicates that the drafters of the First Amendment were aware, and approved of,
property rights in content. But that argument does not comport with the narrowness
of copyright at the time of the Bill of Rights. Courts protected only published
expression, and only against direct piracy. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001); L. Ray Patterson, Understanding, supra note 66,
at 383. As noted earlier in this Article, the strong tradition in copyright was that
ideas, knowledge-in short, the content-in a work belonged to the public, not the
author. See text accompanying supra notes 15-16.
153. I have discussed this history extensively elsewhere. See generally Zimmerman,
Information as Speech, supra note 15.
154. See infra Part III.C.3., notes 225, 237 and accompanying text.
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illuminating of these strands are the cases dealing with libel and
privacy, although contributions also come from the law on trade
secrets and commercial speech. Some scholars have also directed
attention to an area of First Amendment jurisprudence commonly
called the "right to know" in support of protecting the public domain;
although some learning can be gleaned from this area, it turns out on
reconsideration to contribute only in a limited way."' But because of
this earlier work, the right to know will be the first body of doctrine
examined.
1. The Right to Know
In 1996, Professor Patterson and Judge Birch published an article in
which they argued, in pertinent part, that the Constitution guarantees
the public at large a right to access and use public domain materials
embodied in copyrighted expression. 5 6  Their interpretation grew
from an understanding of the interplay between the Intellectual
Property Clause and the Free Speech Clause.'57 On the free speech
side, the authors argued that a "right to learn" meant that materials in
the public domain must be kept freely accessible. They drew
precedent for this conclusion from a body of case law better known in
the First Amendment literature as the "right to know." '158 A few years
155. See infra Part. III.C.1.
156. The authors write that "the First Amendment protects the right to learn (by
reading the published works) in case the copyright owner wishes to deny access to the
work." Patterson & Birch, supra note 35, at 2. They are concerned with the ways
modern technologies can be used to block the use of copyrighted works, and, by
extension, the public domain materials they contain. Id. at 5-6. The article does not,
however, attempt to define the public domain or explain why certain things, such as
facts, belong in it. It also makes a case for a constitutional access right to protected
expression itself under some circumstances. Id. at 9.
157. The right to use content arises, they say, from the fact that "the copyright
clause protects the right to teach (by publishing original works of authorship) and the
First Amendment protects the right to learn (by reading the published works) in case
the copyright owner wishes to deny access to the work." Id. at 2. Although copyright
does give authors incentives to "teach" by publishing new works, and in doing so,
supports the communication of information and ideas, the language of the Clause says
only that Congress "may" provide protections for original works of authorship. I do
not think this soft form of authority supplies a basis for any strong claim of a "right"
to publish or to teach. To the extent that either a right to teach or a right to learn are
a necessary underpinning for protection of the public domain under Patterson and
Birch's approach, it seems that both would more logically arise from the First
Amendment.
158. The First Amendment case relied on by the authors is Board of Education v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), commonly classified as a right to know case. The right to
know has been discussed in the work of many scholars. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The
Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 449, 489-93
(1985) (arguing that "a right of potential speakers 'to know,' that is to have access to
noteworthy information and events, would seem a natural complement to the right to
speak"); Patterson & Birch, supra note 35; Genevra Kay Loveland, Comment,
Newsgathering: Second-Class Right Among First Amendment Freedoms, 53 Tex. L.
Rev. 1440, 1463-64 (1975) (noting that "the fundamental premise of Republican
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later, Professor Benkler picked up a different strand of right to know
theory-public access to the means of communication-to argue that
the government must protect, rather than permit erosion of, the public
domain.159
The problem with relying on this body of law to establish the
existence of a protected public domain is that the "right" in question
is difficult to define. Courts asked to decide a case under this right
have approached the issue with great tentativeness. The right to know
has two aspects. On the one hand, the theory suggests that someone
(here, the government) has a correlative duty to disclose information;
on the other, the theory would permit the government to curtail the
voices of some to enhance the voices of others who might not
otherwise be heard. Because both aspects raise hordes of troubling
issues, the theory continues to occupy a position in First Amendment
doctrine that can most generously be termed marginal, 16° and is
utilized only in rare instances.
libertarian theory that grew out of opposition to the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798
was that '[slociety is possessed of the absolute right to investigate every subject which
relates to its interests"'); Eric G. Olsen, Note, The Right to Know in First Amendment
Analysis, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 505 (1979) (laying out evidence for a First Amendment right
to know); Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 1505, 1505 (1974) ("Meaningful democratic decisionmaking and the
public's ability realistically to perceive and respond to the world require the
widespread availability of information of general interest."). Although Daniel Farber
does not talk about content in terms of a "right to know," he has argued that the First
Amendment can be understood as a means to promote the creation and
dissemination of an optimal level of information, free from the distortions in private
markets that may lead to an undersupply of an essential public good. Farber, supra
note 120. But see Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L.
Rev. 1249, 1252-54 (1995) (suggesting that information does not receive protection
per se from the First Amendment). Post distinguishes navigational charts, which, he
argues, are unprotected content because they are intended to generate reliance rather
than discussion, from art, which, because it is intended to generate discussion and
controversy, is, he claims, protected. Id.; see also Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed
Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 Cal. L. Rev.
482, 487-88 (1980) (expressing the view that the right to know "may be better read as
a recognition that ... freedom from governmental regulation of content facilitates the
dissemination of information to the public and supports the press in its role of
providing information," but "does not guarantee a flow of information to the public
nor... assure that the press will be able to obtain information").
159. Benkler, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 35.
160. Arguments of this type have been made in a number of press cases, where
courts have been urged, typically without success, to find that the First Amendment
protects not only speech, but the process of gathering and developing the content of
the speech. While it is generally agreed that reporters cannot use some methods, such
as breaking and entering or stealing, the claim has been made that the law may not
unnecessarily burden the process of newsgathering where it does not involve palpably
illegal methods. For example, it has been urged that novel applications of tort law to
impede newsgathering should be deemed to violate the First Amendment. See
generally Paul A. LeBel, The Constitutional Interest in Getting the News: Toward a
First Amendment Protection from Tort Liability for Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4
Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1145 (1996); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, I Spy: The
Newsgatherer Under Cover, 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1185 (2000) [hereinafter,
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Patterson and Birch rely, on the free speech side, largely on Board
of Education v. Pico.61 Although the case contains language that
supports the belief that a right exists to access and use uncopyrighted
content, Pico is nonetheless a thin reed on which to hang an argument
about protecting the public domain. The case challenged the removal
of "disapproved" books from a school library by a local board of
education.16 Although the plaintiffs "won" in the sense that a bare
majority of the Court found that summary judgment for the school
board had been improperly granted, in other regards, Pico is a less
than a ringing endorsement of the right to know, and more of an
object lesson in why expanding protection by this route is unlikely.
Only four members of the majority clearly adopted the view that
removal of books from a library by public authorities for purposes of
censorship is a First Amendment violation. 63 And each of those four
struggled with a problem: how they could prevent the removal of
books for purposes of censorship without announcing a principle that
would require school boards to abandon all subjective preferences
when making the decision to acquire books (a result the Justices
clearly thought went too far and was poor policy besides).l 64 The
decision by the plurality, therefore, that some kind of "access to
ideas" is protected by the First Amendment,165 is too hedged with
limitations to infer from Pico any strong right to be informed or to
"learn."
Related areas of legal development reinforce the doubtfulness that
"the right to know" will assist in developing a general theory of the
public domain. For example, the First Amendment protection for
informing oneself might be strengthened were the Court to recognize
a constitutional right to education. But when the opportunity to do so
Zimmerman, I Spy]. Others have argued that the government may not place limits on
access to sources or on the methods for recording news events without compelling
justification. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (holding that the
news media has no constitutional right of access to a county jail); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817 (1974) (upholding prison regulation that prohibited media
representatives from selecting a particular prison inmate for an interview); Saxbe v.
Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (same); Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir.
1977) (press may observe but not film an execution); CBS, Inc. v. Lieberman, 439 F.
Supp. 862 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (barring use of television cameras to record a public
administrative hearing). Although the Supreme Court has agreed in theory that
newsgathering deserves some protection, it has yet to find a case in which to grant
any.
161. 457 U.S. 853 (1982); see Patterson & Birch, supra note 35.
162. Pico, 457 U.S. at 856-60.
163. Justice White, the fifth vote, preferred to withhold judgment on the speech
issue unless required to do so after a full trial. Id. at 883-84. Justice White
characterized the issue in the case as a difficult one in a largely uncharted field. Id. at
884.
164. Id. at 869-72 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); id. at 880-82 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
165. See, e.g., id. at 880-81 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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was presented in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,'66 it was declined. Although the Court occasionally
discusses academic freedom as something that the First Amendment
protects, evidence that academic freedom covers the means to acquire
the information needed for "learning" or knowing is sparse to
nonexistent. 6 7
I am also doubtful that much assistance can be gleaned from some
notion, also labeled a right to know, that the government is permitted
to manage the means of communication so as to maximize the
diversity of voices and views in the marketplace of ideas.1" This, too,
is an interest that has been articulated more often than it has been
applied. Although scholars have argued for decades that the
166. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court wrote that "[e]ducation... is not among the
rights afforded explicit protection under our Constitution. Nor do we find any basis
for saying it is implicitly so protected." Id. at 35.
167. See, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197-98 (1990), in which the
Court denied that academic freedom protected anything other than the freedom to
speak. The specific issue in the case, however, was not the acquisition of learning, but
whether a university's internal tenure review files were protected on a theory of
academic freedom. The argument was that protection for such material was a
condition precedent to the enjoyment of academic freedom by members of the
academic community. The Court disagreed, ruling that the school was obligated to
turn over the records to the EEOC on a simple showing of relevancy. Id. at 194.
Closer to the issues under discussion in this article is In re American Tobacco Co., 880
F.2d 1520, 1528-29 (2d Cir. 1989), in which a federal appellate court expressed grave
doubts that any privilege existed under the First Amendment to protect a non-party
scholar from subpoenas that would interfere with his research. For a fuller discussion
of the issue of academic freedom as a protection for information gathering, see Diane
Leenheer Zimmerman, Scientific Speech in the 1990s, 2 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 254, 262-66
(1993).
Similar arguments by the press for First Amendment protection of information
gathering activities have met with little success in the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (permitting law enforcement officers
to search a newsroom for pictures that would help identify lawbreakers); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that news reporters could be required to reveal
their sources to a grand jury without violating the First Amendment even if doing so
impeded the ability to gather news). Lower courts have been divided over whether
the First Amendment provides at least some partial privilege for news reporters who
are asked to turn over their notes, photographs, testimony or video footage during
criminal trials or civil litigation. For examples of courts that have recognized a partial
privilege to protect sources and journalistic materials, see Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press,
Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972).
But see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
news reporters do not have a qualified privilege not to disclose non-confidential
information in criminal cases); In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that a
reporter, who interviewed a member of the state legislature charged with accepting
bribes, did not have a qualified privilege under the First Amendment against being
forced to testify about information learned in the interview); United States v. King,
194 F.R.D. 569, 584-85 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that the First Amendment did not
privilege a news reporter or news station to refuse to produce the unedited version of
an interview with a government witness in a criminal case).
168. Reliance on this line of cases is made in Benkler, Free as the Air, supra note 1,
at 364-77.
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government has an affirmative responsibility to use its powers to
increase speech diversity, 6 9 prior to the decision in Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,7 ' the government's authority to do
so consistent with free speech principles had been recognized only in
relation to a publicly-owned resource-the airwaves. 7' And even
there, the Supreme Court was reluctant to allow affirmative steps to
diversify speakers out of concern for the other speech values-to wit,
the right of the broadcaster to exercise his editorial judgment free
from restraint-that were implicated.'72
Because Turner Broadcasting was a case involving cable rather than
access to the public airwaves, it arguably opened the door to greater
freedom for government to "manage" communications opportunities.
But the relevance of the case to protection of the public domain is not
necessarily clear.'73 For one thing, cable is an area where the
government role in licensing has always been central, and rules that
apply to that medium may well not be ones from which to derive
general principles. Furthermore, recognition that the government has
power to preserve a rich marketplace of ideas is not the same as a
requirement that it do so. Presently, nothing in this line of cases
evinces an acceptance of the idea of affirmative obligations to
intervene on behalf of free speech.'74 Hence, the posited existence of
a mandatory public domain would seem to receive no support from
this source, even though, rhetorically, its endorsement of the idea that
speech presupposes "knowing" or "learning" or observing continues
to have theoretical power. 75 It is difficult to disagree logically with
169. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment
Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (1967) (advocating for a right of access to ensure that the
widest diversity of voices will be heard).
170. 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding requirement that cable companies carry local
broadcast television channels).
171. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (finding
constitutional a government requirement that the subject of a personal attack on a
broadcast be given air time to respond). But see Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241 (1974) (finding that a right of reply statute as applied to a newspaper is
an unconstitutional interference with editorial discretion).
172. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)
(holding that broadcasters, as journalists, are entitled to discretion about what to put
on the air, and cannot be required to accept editorial advertising).
173. Turner Broadcasting, 520 U.S. at 180.
174. Even where the government owns or controls the speech good or the facility
for speech activities, affirmative duties have not been recognized. For example, in
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998), the
Court concluded that a state-owned public television station was under no affirmative
obligation to open a political debate among Congressional candidates to everyone
who was in the race.
175. According to Professor Rabban, one important figure in American history
who saw a direct link between freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion and a
"right to education" was John Dewey. Dewey believed that education was an
essential component in constructing a democratic society in which citizens were able
to participate meaningfully. See generally David M. Rabban, Free Speech in
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Justice Brennan's claim in Pico that "the right to receive ideas is a
necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own
rights of speech, press, and political freedom. 1 76
There are, however, a few circumscribed areas where a right to
know, and a concomitant duty to disclose, clearly can be seen to make
solid contributions to a mandatory public domain. These are
situations where the material at issue relates to certain core
government actions and proceedings, and where commodification of
the information involved would interfere with public knowledge about
these activities.
First, the Constitution itself requires that some information
affirmatively be given to the public, and to remain available without
restrictions on its subsequent use. Article I of the Constitution, for
example, provides that the Senate and House of Representatives
"shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same.' 1 77  This does not, of course, demand that everything
Congress does must be entirely transparent and in the mandatory
public domain. The framers left Congress considerable discretion to
conduct business in private without obliging it to report fully on its
activities to the public.'78 The Constitution, for example, allows
Congress to decide what things, "in their Judgment require Secrecy,"
and allows, if more than four-fifths of the members desire it, the
identities of those who vote for and against legislation to be concealed
from the public.'79
The President is also required in Article II to "from time to time
give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and
recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient."'180 Like the Congressional Record, the
State of the Union address has traditionally been available to the
public and may be required to be so, although in point of fact, that
requirement is not explicit in the text of the Constitution.8 Due
Progressive Social Thought, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 951 (1996).
176. Bd. of Ed. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982).
177. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
178. BeVier, supra note 158.
History is both as elusive and as suggestive on the "right to know" question
as it is on all of the questions of contemporary relevance which the framers
did not specifically address. Not having had to confront the argument that
the Constitution in principle guaranteed citizens access to the internal
workings of the government, the framers cannot be said either to have
accepted or rejected the proposition in terms clear enough unalterably to
confine today's choices. Historical practice suggests, however, that the
framers did not think it illegitimate to conduct important governmental
affairs in confidence.
Id. at 500-01 (footnotes omitted).
179. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 3.
180. Id. art. II, § 3.
181. The same might be said for census data, which must be collected under U.S.
Constitution, Article I, Section 2, Clause 3, and has traditionally been made public,
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process is generally understood to require that legislation and judicial
decisions must be available to the public free of restrictions on their
reuse. 182
Finally, the Sixth Amendment provides for public criminal trials,183
although the Supreme Court has made clear that, because this right
was intended to protect defendants rather than to provide information
to the public, the defendant can waive it.18 4 However, after deciding in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale185 that the public and the press did not
share defendants' Sixth Amendment right to public criminal trials, the
Supreme Court faced a rash of court closings virtually for the first
time in American history. It responded in 1980 by finding an
affirmative right of the public and the press to attend criminal trials in
the First Amendment."6 One could imagine other situations with
plausible claims of a right of access to government information, but in
reality the practical problems created by extending an affirmative
claim of this sort have made it doubtful that the Court will ever reach
beyond the courthouse in making the government reveal its
operations to the public. 87
In summary, the "right to know" accounts for only a very limited
piece of the mandatory public domain, and is unlikely to do more
because it is limited to information controlled by government sources.
It will do little to help retain access to and use of such other essential
although no such explicit requirement is found in the governing document.
182. This issue has come up, indirectly, in copyright cases, where private parties
have claimed exclusive rights to publish statutes or court opinions. Copyright in these
has generally been rejected. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000) (copyright unavailable
for any work of the United States government); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
591, 668 (1834) (stating in dictum that state judicial opinions are not copyrightable).
Often the reason given for why such material cannot be copyrighted is that the public
has a right of unrestricted access to the laws, judicial and statutory, that govern them.
See, e.g., Bldg. Officials & Code Adm'rs v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734-35 (1st
Cir. 1980) (citing due process considerations); Harrison Co. v. Code Revision
Comm'n, 260 S.E.2d 30, 34 (Ga. 1979) ("[A] state's laws are public records open to
inspection, digesting and compiling by anyone."); State v. Mitchell, 74 P.2d 417, 424
(Mont. 1937) (noting that anyone is free to publish law that is binding on all citizens).
183. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
184. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
185. Id.
186. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) was the first case
to recognize an affirmative First Amendment right to information. See also Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
187. Professor Vincent Blasi has said of these developments in the First
Amendment right to know:
There is no shortage of rhetoric in the first amendment tradition extolling
the right to know, but only recently has that rhetoric ripened into judicial
doctrine. The Court has granted journalists a constitutional right of access
to various trial proceedings and a highly contingent right to investigate
certain prison conditions, but those rights have been extended cautiously
and with great attention to limiting principles.
Blasi, supra note 158, at 489 (footnotes omitted).
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elements of discourse and learning, such as factual information about
the private sector, ideas, events that occur in public settings, life
experiences, or uncopyrighted expressive works. For this reason,
other areas of First Amendment doctrine necessarily must be relied
upon if freedom to use these sorts of speech goods is to be secured.
The Article now turns, therefore, in other directions.
2. Public Discourse Theory as a Basis for Inferring the Existence of a
Mandatory Public Domain
The constitutional privileges that have attached to defamatory
falsehoods since the early 1960s have been explained by the Supreme
Court as necessary to ensure the full and free discussion of matters of
public concern that the Constitution envisions. Professor Robert Post
has traced back to the 1930s and 1940s the Court's understanding of
protection of public discourse as a core of the purpose and meaning of
the Free Speech Clause.188 But New York Times Co. v. Sullivan189
brought this understanding of the First Amendment to the fore,
articulating in the process not only the Free Speech and Press Clauses'
role in fostering "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate19 ° on
public issues, but the need to protect the use of one's choice of
content to fuel that discourse.19" ' To that end, Sullivan and its
successors went so far as to find defamatory falsehoods, ordinarily not
a form of speech sheltered by the First Amendment, to be privileged
in order to minimize the risk that speakers would be inhibited from
engaging in otherwise legitimate exchanges of ideas and positions.
192
In elaborating the Sullivan privileges, the Court was not inventing a
new theory about content. Rather, it was ratifying a position that had
already become firmly embedded in the common law of libel. State
courts had long-established privileges, such as the fair comment rule
in defamation and newsworthiness in privacy law, to draw a protective
cordon around content. 193 That such privileges had constitutional
standing was first acknowledged in Sullivan.'94
The privacy cases provide the clearest evidence that the freedom to
draw on information for the substance of one's communications is
inextricably linked to the exercise of speech rights.195  In all
188. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 601, 629-31 (1990) [hereinafter Post, The Constitutional Concept].
189. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
190. Id. at 270.
191. Id. at 271-72.
192. See, e.g., id. at 279 & n.19.
193. See id. at 273-74, 292 n. 30.
194. The actual malice rule adopted in Sullivan was drawn from the common law
fair comment rules. See Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cited in
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272.
195. See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (finding that the identification
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jurisdictions that adopted the tort of invasion of privacy, the ability to
recover was limited to cases where the information at issue was not
deemed to be newsworthy. 9 6 So powerful was the privilege covering
newsworthy information and so broad was the definition given to the
term, that suits challenging accurate disclosures of legitimately
obtained information, however embarrassing or harmful to the
plaintiff, were almost never successful.'97 It made no difference to the
of a rape victim is protected speech); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97
(1979) (publishing the name of a juvenile defendant is protected speech); Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (identifying a judge subject to
disciplinary proceedings is protected speech); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (holding that unless knowingly false, an
incorrect version of a story about individuals taken hostage is protected speech). For
other cases discussing the importance of freedom to use content bearing on matters of
public concern, see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (finding that
a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot be used to stifle
speech on a matter of public concern) and Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (discussing the public concern standard, but declining to
apply it to privilege a violation of plaintiff's right of publicity).
196. The one exception was the sub-branch of the tort dealing with intrusions into
seclusion. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977). Here, the gravamen of the
wrong was not the communication of information, but the way the information was
obtained. Since the information was acquired as a result of an unlawful act, any use
of it could be sanctioned. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir.
1971) (wearing a tape recorder and carrying a hidden camera into a private home was
a wrongful intrusion); Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (secretly
recording activities in a workplace not open to the general public is a wrongful
intrusion). The point that information-gathering, rather than dissemination, is central
to this tort is clear since public dissemination is not necessary for a cause of action to
arise. Some of the best known intrusion cases did not involve any republication of the
information gathered by the tortfeasor. See, e.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d
239 (N.H. 1964) (finding a landlord liable for hiding a microphone under a tenant's
bed); see also Fowler v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1965) (finding a
cause of action for invasion of privacy even where there was no further dissemination
of improperly gathered material).
197. State common law continued to hold out the possibility that some disclosures
might be so offensive and so unjustifiable that they could be punished. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts, for example, said that the right to disseminate
personal information about others could be limited if "the publicity.., becomes a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake." Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. h (1977). This exception was rarely applied, however.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969) (issuing an
injunction to protect privacy where a documentary film showed inmates of a state
institution, while naked, being force-fed, and in the process of dying). No case
decided by the United States Supreme Court was found to reach a level of sufficient
offensiveness to justify governmental regulation. The major limitation on the right of
free dissemination was contractual; an individual who had undertaken to protect them
could, for example, be sanctioned for disclosing trade secrets or government security
information. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding secrecy
agreement signed by former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency who
published a book without submitting it for requisite review). Even here, once others
not bound by trade secrecy or security agreements learned the relevant information,
they were free to use and share it. Although it has recognized the possibility that a
prior restraint could be issued to protect national security or human life, Near v.
Minn. ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the Supreme Court has thus far rejected all
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outcome whether the complaining party was a public figure, a public
official, or simply a private person.'98  As a general matter,
information of public interest was information that was of interest to
the public, not what was in some absolute sense "important."
In its own series of decisions dealing with privacy interests, the
Supreme Court was reluctant to impose limits on the use of
information once defendants became aware of it through legitimate
means. In fact, the Court several times expressed serious doubt that
the First Amendment would ever permit the use of accurate
information to be sanctioned. 9 9 Some understanding of the thinking
behind this position can be gleaned from a famous passage by Justice
Brennan in Time, Inc. v. Hill,00 a false light invasion of privacy case. 01
Writing for the majority, he explained that:
Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of
life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an
essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on
freedom of speech and of press. "Freedom of discussion, if it would
fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues
about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." 202
The Court has applied the "once learned, free to use" principle to
several kinds of content, including the identity of rape victims, the
name of a juvenile defender, and information about a judge accused
of misconduct.0 3
Admittedly, in most of these cases, the information in question
came from public records or was disclosed by public officials or during
public proceedings. One way, therefore, to understand the
attempts to impose one. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)
(refusing to uphold injunction against press coverage of preliminary hearing); N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (refusing to enjoin publication of
Pentagon Papers).
198. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren
and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 291, 344-47 (1983).
199. See, e.g., Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 533; Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 496.
200. 385 U.S. at 388.
201. False light invasion of privacy occurs when defendant publishes inaccurate
information about a plaintiff that, while not necessarily libelous, is "highly offensive
to a reasonable" person. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977). For a
discussion of this tort, see Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of
Privacy: The Light that Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 364 (1989).
202. Time Inc., 385 U.S. at 388 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102
(1940)). Similar language appears in numerous other cases. See, e.g., Fla. Star, 491
U.S. at 533 (disclosure of identity of rape victim); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443
U.S. 97, 104-05 (1979) (publishing the name of juvenile defendant); Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842 (1978) (identifying a state judge
whose alleged conduct triggered a state inquiry); Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430
U.S. 308, 311 (1977) (publishing the name and photograph of a juvenile defendant);
Cox Broad. Corp, 420 U.S. at 489 (identifying a rape victim).
203. See cases cited in supra note 202.
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construction of the mandatory public domain is to think of it as
donating to public use only that information that the government
must disclose, or opts to disclose,2°1 in unrestricted form.2 5 The recent
decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper20 6 demonstrates, however, that this
conception of the public domain is far too limited. The mandatory
public domain must also be understood as extending to information
that is wholly private in its origins.20 7
204. The disclosures may be inadvertent, Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 536, or may occur
through a leak, Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 832, but once the information
has "escaped," the Court has refused to allow the government to re-enclose it. Some
lower court cases have attempted to distinguish this precedent and find that
information released by mistake can sometimes be re-enclosed. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen
Research Group v. FDA, 953 F. Supp. 400 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that where
government inadvertently discloses a trade secret of a private party, it can prevent
further distribution of the material).
205. The Supreme Court has allowed the government to grant access selectively
under some circumstances. See, e.g., L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g
Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999) (finding that the government may establish criteria for
who can obtain access to certain government records); cf. Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (establishing that even though the
contents were publicly revealed, the press was not entitled to physical copies of
presidential tapes). However, those who receive such access and are not bound by a
prior promise not to disclose what they learn, appear to be free thereafter to
communicate the information without further restrictions. See L.A. Police Dep't, 528
U.S. at 40. In some limited circumstances, however, the context within which one can
utilize information in the public domain can be regulated. Time, place, and manner
restrictions might limit the communication of public domain material through
loudspeakers. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1972). At
times, the state might be able to prevent a speaker from conveying information to
someone who does not wish to receive it. See id. The Supreme Court has made it
clear, however, that it is skeptical about listener interests as a justification for limiting
what speakers can communicate. For example, in Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1943), the Court struck down a municipal statute that made it unlawful for "any
person distributing handbills, circulars or other advertisements" to ring the doorbell
or summon the residents of the house for the purpose of receiving the handbills. Id. at
142. The Court found that while trespassing was a serious problem, communities
could not create anti-trespassing laws without considering "the constitutional rights of
those desiring to distribute literature and those desiring to receive it." Id. at 149. The
Court also stated that the freedom to distribute information was "vital to the
preservation of a free society" and must be protected. Id. at 146-47; see also Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1989) (striking down a
Federal Communications Commission regulation banning indecent telephone
messages as unnecessarily broad because the caller to a dial-in service would be a
willing listener to the message).
206. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). For another recent case suggesting that content is part of
what the First Amendment protects, see Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
533 (2001).
207. Bartnicki, of course, is not the only case of its kind. In several earlier Supreme
Court cases turning on a public concern rationale, the information at issue was also
generated by and from private sources. The facts on which the play in Time, Inc. v.
Hill was based had been widely reported in the media, and much of the information
undoubtedly came from interviews with members of the public or on-site observation.
385 U.S. 374, 393 (1967). In Landmark Communications, the information about the
judge whose conduct was a source of inquiry was not alleged to have come through
any official government channel. 435 U.S. at 831-32. Similarly, Hustler Magazine, Inc.
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The dispute in Bartnicki involved the application of federal and
state wiretap laws to republish information derived from
eavesdropping on cellular telephone calls. The parties said to be in
violation of the laws were not those who intercepted the calls, but
rather members of the press who had received, and reported on, tapes
of the conversations. According to the statutes in question, it was
illegal to use material from intercepted calls as long as the user
"'kn[ew] or ha[d] reason to know that the information was obtained"'
by illicit means." 8
The conversation captured on tape in Bartnicki was between two
teachers' union representatives during a heated labor dispute with the
local school board.2"9 The person who made the recording was never
identified because he or she had sent the tape to the press
anonymously.210 The conversation contained threatening language
(although how serious the threats were is debatable) directed toward
board officials.21 After the conversation was reported in local
newspapers and played on local broadcasts, the union representatives
sued the press for violation of the statutes, seeking actual, statutory
and punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs.212
The Supreme Court ruled for the defendants on the ground that
mere knowledge that the recordings in question were illegal did not
make their receipt and republication wrongful.1 3 In the absence of
wrongdoing at the acquisition stage, publication of "truthful
v. Fallwell did not involve information stemming from government sources. 485 U.S.
46, 48 (1988). The common law privacy cases also recognized a privilege to use
privately generated information. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir.
1975) (noting that information about a surfer came from interviews with the subject
and acquaintances). Although many of the Supreme Court's defamation cases have
involved government officials or government proceedings, the source of the
information reported was often private. See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S.
265 (1971) (discussing a situation where a senatorial candidate was characterized by
the defendant as a "former small-time bootlegger"); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 135 (1967) (noting that the football coach was accused of "fixing" a football
game). This principle is widely recognized in state and lower federal court precedent
as well. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th
Cir. 1996) (permitting Business Week to publish information obtained from a sealed
document that was given to it by a private attorney and noting that the Constitution
would be violated if government were to prevent a "news organization from
publishing information in its possession on a matter of public concern"); Ford Motor
Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (holding that recipient of trade
secrets who owes no duty to the owner is free to publish the information).
208. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 520 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (2000)).
209. Id. at 518.
210. Id. at 519.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 519-20.
213. Id. at 517-18. Illegality in this case was held to mean something other than
violating positive law. Communicating the contents of intercepted telephone calls
was protected speech as long as the communicators did not instigate or participate in
the interception, but simply received the "fruits" of someone else's illegal act after the
fact. Id. at 525.
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information of public concern '214 could not be sanctioned. Although
the majority made plain that the privacy interests protected by the
statute were substantial, this was not enough to render constitutional
the attempt to regulate the use of information by innocent third
parties once they had learned it.215  "[PIrivacy concerns," Justice
Stevens wrote, "give way when balanced against the interest in
publishing matters of public importance." '216 Perhaps another way to
make the point would be to say that noncontractual limitations on the
use of information will not survive unless they can pass the exacting
standards of strict scrutiny.
After reading Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, it becomes clear
that both the majority and the dissent in Bartnicki acknowledged a
First Amendment protection for the public domain. The dissenters217
expressly agreed with the majority that once information has been
legitimately acquired,218 only a state interest of the highest level of
importance can justify restricting its free reuse.219 They disagreed with
214. Id. at 534. The majority set aside for purposes of this case the broader issue of
whether application of the statute would be permissible if what had been disclosed
was "trade secrets or domestic gossip or other information of purely private concern."
Id. at 533.
215. Id. at 529-30.
216. Id. at 534. A concurrence by Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor,
takes a narrower position than that which appears in Justice Stevens's opinion. Id. at
535 (Breyer, J., concurring). Breyer and O'Connor, for example, stress what they call
the unusual circumstances of the case, including the fact that the plaintiffs were
"limited public figures," and that the content of the taped telephone call was
unusually important. Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring). According to Justice Breyer,
the calls involved "threats to public safety," a description that may strike readers of
the opinion as somewhat surprising. Id. In the course of discussing how to get
negotiations back on track between the teachers and the school board, one union
representative said to the other:
"If they're not gonna move for three percent, we're gonna have to go to
their, their homes .... To blow off their front porches, we'll have to do
some work on some of those guys. (PAUSES). Really, uh, really and
truthfully because this is, you know, this is bad news."
Id. at 518-19. In prior cases, the Court has tended to treat language such as this as
"rhetorical hyperbole," absent substantial reason to believe that the speaker was
being literal. See, e.g., Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974)
(characterizing strike-breaking workers as traitors to their country and persons of
poor character is metaphoric, not literal, use of language); Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g
Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (characterizing a plaintiff's behavior as
"blackmail" is rhetorical hyperbole). The concurrence is somewhat puzzling, because
both Justices also signed on to the Stevens opinion.
217. The dissent was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541.
218. Excluded from discussion here are situations involving trade secrets or
voluntary confidentiality agreements. Both may bar individuals under some
circumstances from using or disseminating specified speech goods. See infra Part
III.C.3.
219. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 545 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. Daily
Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)). In fact, the dissent makes reference at least
three times to the effect of having information in the public domain in the course of
the opinion. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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the majority only on whether the information in question in this case
had actually entered the public domain, not on the consequences if it
had.22 ° To the dissenters, the taint of the illegal acquisition by the
source carried over to the third parties who chose to publish the
information knowing that the taping was illicit. Under these
circumstances, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the information did
not move into the public domain because it failed the requirement
that it be legally obtained.221
For the purposes of this Article, the history of legal efforts to
regulate information used in the interests of personal privacy is
interesting in other ways as well. The underlying justification given
for the legal right to prevent disclosure of embarrassing personal
information is essentially that individuals have something like a
property right in the facts of their lives. Indeed, Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis, whose famous law review article is agreed to have
jump-started the modern tort of invasion of privacy,222 relied heavily
on common law copyright principles and cases as the source of their
claimed privacy right.223  Thus, privacy tort law has more than a
passing relevance to the legitimacy of generating new forms of
intellectual property rights. 24
Interestingly, from the birth of the common law right of privacy,
courts recognized that there is a downside to granting individuals
control over how others can use information about them. It
significantly strips others of the wherewithal to form their own ideas,
utilize their own observations, and communicate about these things
220. Id. at 545, 554-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
221. See id. at 548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
222. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193 (1890).
223. The only reason the authors departed from the property theory, it seems, is
that they believed treating privacy as a property right demeaned its importance as an
aspect of human dignity. Id. at 205. A history of the origins of privacy in the doctrine
of common law copyright is laid out in Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra
note 15, at 692-703.
224. Indeed, after a half century of development of the privacy interest, a new
branch reached into traditional intellectual property territory. Judge Jerome Frank,
in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953),
decided, at least, that the interest of celebrities in the control of personal information
about themselves was not in privacy, but in money. Hence, he recognized a new
property interest now widely known and accepted as the right of publicity. Id. at 868.
For discussions of the right of publicity, see Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of
Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 Vand.
L. Rev. 1199, 1203-15 (1986); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 Ind. L.J. 1 (1997);
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 127, 147-78 (1993); J. Thomas McCarthy, The Human Persona
as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 129
(1995); and Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of
Publicity?, 9 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 35 (1998) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Right
of Publicity].
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with friends, colleagues, and fellow citizens. 225  The fear of this
unconstitutional consequence is why broad newsworthiness rules have
cabined the tort almost to the point of annihilation. 226 This strongly
suggests that the ability to use speech goods is a necessary element of
what the First Amendment protects, and that, as a result, it is very
risky to allow individuals to "own" or control use of their life stories.
Relying on case law designed to promote public discourse to protect
the public domain will, of course, have greater appeal for those
theorists who believe that the First Amendment is limited to
promoting democratic participation and decision making 27 than it will
for those to whom the promotion of autonomy and self-realization is
the preferred understanding of the Free Speech Clause. 228  The
225. Privacy cases illustrate this beautifully. In many of them, the information that
one individual wants to use involves the lives of others, but also relates directly to
how the speaker perceives her own life and experience. If the individual cannot use
the information she has internalized from observing and interacting with other
people, she will be unable to speak adequately about her own life. See, e.g., Haynes v.
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993) (describing a situation where
interviewee discloses details of her marriage to author who subsequently uses them in
his book, and the interviewee's former husband objects to publication on grounds that
his wife's revelations about her life with him invade his privacy); Hall v. Post, 372
S.E.2d 711, 712-13 (N.C. 1988) (recounting how one person's revelation of
information in the course of searching for her daughter was said by the daughter and
her adoptive parent to invade their privacy). On a more abstract and sophisticated
plane, one author has written:
Each of our minds knows it is alone in a universe it creates; yet in our
attempts to communicate, among ourselves and other species, we reveal a
struggle to know other minds, to overcome the isolation of our own
mind.... [What distinguishes] human beings from other beings... is the
quest to understand the minds of others. It is a human belief that, through
language, we can both transfer the contents of our mind to another and
come to experience the contents of the minds of others.
Candland, supra note 126, at 355.
226. Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note 15, at 713-14.
227. For adherents of the view that the First Amendment is intended to promote
democratic values, the conception of "public concern" varies considerably. For some,
the speech commons might be limited to matters expressly political in nature. See,
e.g., Bork, supra note 121, at 20 ("Constitutional protection should be accorded only
to speech that is explicitly political."). For others, meaningful participation in self-
governance requires access to a much wider variety of materials, many not at all
explicitly political. Meiklejohn, after initially endorsing a narrower definition of
political speech in his book Political Freedom, ultimately modified his position in
response to criticism that the First Amendment, conceived of as he suggested, would
omit protection for novels, plays, works of science and philosophy, and much else of
great value to the society. See Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, supra note 125, at 24-28,
55-57, 79-80; see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 891, 899-
900 (1949) (reviewing Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech: And Its Relation to Self-
Government (1948)). Upon reconsideration, Meiklejohn said that such nonpolitical
works would indeed qualify for protection under his theory because they were sources
from which "the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human
values: the capacity for sane and objective judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot
should express." Meiklejohn, First Amendment, supra note 125, at 256.
228. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1989);
David Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
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content necessary to feed public discourse would seem to be a more
limited class of materials than that which would be demanded by an
autonomy rationale. Autonomy theory would require a right to use
whatever legitimately-acquired information the individual chooses to
draw upon for self-actualization, regardless of its public or private
nature. Limiting protection to content on matters of public concern
might seem seriously underinclusive to autonomy theorists.
There are two reasons to suppose, however, that the support
marshaled here for a mandatory public domain would be more
inclusive than it appears at first sight. For one thing, courts have been
reluctant in all but a few instances to apply their own normative
standards to the question of what is and is not of "legitimate" public
concern. The term, therefore, as a practical matter, has largely come
to mean material that is of possible interest to some subgroup for
some reason.
229
The commercial speech line of cases is instructive in this regard.
Information about products and services is likely in most cases to have
only a tenuous connection with matters of public concern if that term
is narrowly confined to issues relating to governance. The primary
reason frequently repeated by the Supreme Court, however, for
bringing such speech under the umbrella of the First Amendment is
the public interest in allowing individuals to access and use such
content.230 Thus, while a public interest-based privilege might not, on
the margins, be adequate to realize the autonomy ideal fully (failing,
as it might, to extend to materials that only one single individual or a
Amendment, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45 (1974); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204 (1972).
229. For an interesting discussion of the inability of courts to impose a limiting
definition on what may constitute "matters of public concern," see Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 78-81 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
noted that the use of a public interest standard had essentially destroyed attempts to
create a common law right of privacy because virtually everything published met the
standard. Id. at 80; see also Post, The Constitutional Concept, supra note 188, at 681-82
(because all speech is potentially relevant to democratic discourse, it all logically
ought to be classified as being of public concern). Subsequently, the Court backed
away from privileging negligent defamation in all cases of public concern, opting
instead for a graduated privilege that turned on the status of the plaintiff (was she a
public or a private figure?). See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 331-32,
351-52 (1974). In a tiny handful of subsequent cases, the Court did rule that some
speech was purely private, and therefore unprivileged as a First Amendment matter.
See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (punitive
damages can be assessed for defamatory speech that is not on a matter of public
concern without a requirement that actual malice be shown); Connick v. Meyers, 461
U.S. 138 (1983) (First Amendment rights of employee not violated because the
speech that led to dismissal did not touch on a matter of public concern). Whether
the Court would be as willing to exercise its discretion in deciding whether speech is
public or private outside the special circumstances of these two cases (where a
defamatory falsehood is the speech at issue, or where the issue is the decision to
discipline an employee for disruptive actions) is a question that remains open.
230. See infra note 237.
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very small group is interested in exploring or communicating),2 1 it
would certainly accommodate most of what individuals, including
small groups of them, want to talk about. Nor is it inconsistent with
the future recognition of a more open-ended right to utilize content
freely.
Second, it is actually impossible to tell in advance whether some
particular item of content will or will not be used in discourse on
matters of public issues. Thus, any rule that permits public or private
entities to ration the use of published or publicly accessible
information has the potential to restrict such discussions. Therefore,
even though uses may be sanctionable for the harm they cause in
particular instances, any legal assignment of prior property or quasi-
property rights in a category of specific, publicly known speech goods
should fail constitutional muster. This is because, a fortiori, per se
restrictions on the use of speech goods could lead to shrinkage in
public discourse. 32
3. The Law Protecting Secrets and Refusing to Protect the "Not
Secret"
The case law discussed thus far all revolves around information
about individuals and business or nonprofit institutions and
organizations. It is not a very big stretch to conclude that if granting
private rights to control the dissemination of "private" information
about individuals interferes impermissibly with discussion about
matters of public concern, so too would granting private rights to
control the use of other kinds of facts or other information about
events or subjects that are similarly essential. Although the latter type
of information does not involve the lives of other people, it is also
necessary if the rest of us are to be able to explore elements of our
shared experience or make choices about the kind of society in which
we live. Support for a broader concept of the public domain,
incorporating much more than personal information, is now emerging
from other sources, including the law governing the protection of
secrets.
The law of trade secrets, a branch of intellectual property law,
protects business entities against the use or revelation of secret
proprietary information by entities who either have a duty not to
disclose it or who obtain the secret information by illicit means.233
231. See supra note 37.
232. This point will be developed and supported later in the Article. See infra Part
III.D.
233. See generally Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 39-40 (1995) and
accompanying commentary. Illicit means included "theft, wiretapping, or even aerial
reconnaissance." Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974).
Legitimate means included reverse engineering, independent invention or "accidental
disclosure." Id.
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This information may include such diverse matters as customer lists,
formulas or manufacturing methods, 2 34 and it is designed to prevent
unfair trade practices by competitors.235 Once the information at issue
is no longer actually secret, however, its further use and dissemination
generally cannot be punished.2 36 This distinction in the treatment of
what is "known" and "not known" runs along similar lines of
reasoning to those used in the case law on personal privacy. There,
too, courts generally allow free reuse of information gleaned from
public occasions or in public places, 23 7 while severely restricting use of
what is learned by spying on people in places where they have gone to
withdraw from public view.
Although trade secrecy protection has not traditionally been viewed
as having a First Amendment aspect, a careful reading of the trade
secrets cases, especially recent ones, suggests that the inability to
protect speech goods once they cease to be secret rests, as is true in
the privacy case law, not merely on common law principles, but on
constitutional ones as well.
Attempts to apply provisions in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act that deal with the
liability of "tippees" has brought to the fore the free speech issues
embedded in trade secrecy.238 These are individuals who, having
learned the secret from an intermediary, go on to further disseminate
234. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. d (1995).
235. This principle is illustrated by Omnitech International, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 11
F.3d 1316 (5th Cir. 1994). The Court in Omnitech said that for a trade secret to be
treated as "appropriated," the defendant must have gotten some sort of unfair
advantage over the plaintiff. Id. at 1325. Merely getting smarter as a result of learning
a trade secret is not enough to create liability. Id.
236. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475; see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1002 (1984).
237. Events on public streets, for example, are not deemed to be private. See, e.g.,
Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ind. 1991) (supporting the proposition that
things visible on public streets do not give rise to actions for invasion of privacy);
Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 857-58 (R.I. 1998) (same); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d
556, 564 (Utah 1988) (same). Also, courts have generally refused to treat as "private"
matters exposed to more limited groups-for example, to friends at a party. See, e.g.,
Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that plaintiff's bizarre
behavior, exhibited at parties, was not "private" and could be reported). But see
Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998) (suggesting that it is a
question of fact for the jury whether an accident scene was public or private); Rafferty
v. Hartford Courant Co., 416 A.2d 1215 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980) (holding that events
occurring at a divorce party could be private). The line between what is secret and
what is public is obviously not entirely bright-line, and from time to time is a matter
that must be litigated.
238. The Uniform Act was first promulgated in 1979 by the State Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. Uniform Trade Secrets Act (1985), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1980s/utsa85.htm (last visited Aug. 25,
2004). It has subsequently been adopted in whole or with some modifications in
forty-four states and the District of Columbia. A Few Facts About the ... Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-
fs-utsa.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
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the proprietary information. Historically, liability for disclosure or
use of a trade secret was limited to those individuals who directly
violated some duty not to use or disclose it,239 or to parties who
engaged in illicit acts to acquire information that the proprietor had
taken appropriate measures to keep secret.240 Courts sometimes came
across cases, however, where business rivals acquired what they knew
were a competitor's trade secrets from, say, a former employee who
was not entitled to reveal them. In this situation, it was sometimes
thought to be just and proper to extend the duty of confidentiality to
the business rivals on the ground that it was unfair for them to benefit
commercially from knowing use of someone else's proprietary
information.24' This principle was embodied both in the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act and the Third Restatement, each of which took the
position that a third person could also not disclose or otherwise use a
trade secret when that party knew or had reason to know that the
information in question was either improperly obtained or revealed. 42
Because the language was not explicitly limited to competitive
situations, it was still broad enough on its face to apply to people who
learned secrets but had reasons other than gaining a competitive
advantage to use or further disseminate them.
239. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475 (indicating that under the Ohio trade secrecy
law, a duty to protect trade secrets is imposed on anyone who received access to the
information "under the express or implied restriction of nondisclosure or nonuse").
240. Typical examples of illicit means include wiretapping, fraud, or burglary.
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 43 cmt. c (1995). Sometimes,
creative -although not inherently illegal-means of acquiring trade secrets will be
treated as illicit. For example, in one well-known case, a company hired someone to
fly over its competitor's chemical plant during construction to take aerial photographs
in the hopes of learning certain secret information. The court concluded that
surveillance by these means was "illicit," even though, had the information in
question been plainly visible from the street, it might not have been protected. E.I.
duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015-17 (5th Cir. 1970).
241. See, e.g., Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376-77 (7th Cir. 1953).
242. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act, supra note 238. The Uniform Act states that
misappropriation of a trade secret occurs if, without the owner's consent, a third
person "who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by
improper means," id § 1(2)(i), or who
at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived from or through a person who
had utilized improper means to acquire it; (II) acquired under circumstances
giving rise to a duty to the maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (III)
derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking
relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use.
Id. § 1(2)(ii)(B).
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition adopts the same position:
A person who obtains a trade secret by inducing or knowingly accepting a
disclosure from a third person who has acquired the secret by improper
means, or who induces or knowingly accepts a disclosure from a third person
that is in breach of a duty of confidence owed by the third person to the
trade secret owner, also acquires the secret by improper means.
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 43 cmt. c (1995).
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Whatever one may think about a rule that limits knowing use by
business competitors of a rival's secret information, courts have begun
to see the serious free speech questions posed by the application of
the rule to non-competing third-party recipients. A number of them
have grappled with publication of alleged trade secrets by the press in
situations where the reporter knew or had reason to know that the
information was supposed to be a trade secret, and they have
hesitated to enjoin or sanction such revelations on the ground that it
would violate freedom of speech.2 43  A federal district court, for
example, refused to enjoin the publisher of blueovalnews.com, a
website that focuses on the Ford Motor Company, from publishing
trade secrets learned through leaks from a Ford employee,244 relying
on the First Amendment.245
At least two other jurisdictions have wrestled specifically with the
application of the provisions of the Uniform Act to tippees who were
not competitors. In DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, a California
intermediate appellate court held that, where an individual was under
no contractual or fiduciary obligation to protect trade secrets, the
defendant's First Amendment interest in publishing overrode the
proprietary interest of the plaintiff in preventing revelation of its trade
secrets.246 In that case, an individual posted up information on how to
243. After Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), that hesitancy seems well
founded. The central issue in that case was, of course, whether reporters could be
barred from repeating information when they knew it had come from a tainted
source. According to the Supreme Court, awareness was not determinative; the
legitimacy of a sanction depended on whether the recipient had participated in some
way in actual wrongdoing to acquire the information in the first instance. Id.
244. Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999); cf. Bridge
C.A.T. Scan Assocs. v. Technicare Corp., 710 F.2d 940, 946 (2d Cir. 1983) (First
Amendment relevant to claims relating to trade secrets).
245. The court expressed concern, however, about some aspects of the defendant's
activities that seemed to involve threats, and the possibly retaliatory publication of
some design and product information that, the court said, were of more interest to
competitors than to the public. These might be grounds for liability, but not for a
prior restraint. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d at 753. In finding that publication of
matters of public concern were protected, even where trade secrets were involved, the
Ford Motor Co. court relied heavily on an earlier decision by the Sixth Circuit in
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996). The Procter
& Gamble case was a bit more complex than the Ford Motor Co. case. In Procter &
Gamble, sealed papers concerning alleged trade secrets were turned over to a
reporter for Business Week by an attorney who was not aware of the fact that they
were confidential. The reporter who obtained them also seems not to have known
that they were covered by a protective order; however, the editor of the story in
question did know, and wanted to use the information in a Business Week article.
Nevertheless, the appellate court permitted the material to be published, concluding
that "[tihe private litigants' interest in protecting their vanity or their commercial self-
interest simply does not qualify as grounds for imposing a prior restraint." Id. at 225.
246. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001), rev'd, 75 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003). The intermediate appellate court relied to a
considerable extent on the Supreme Court decision in Bartnicki. Id.
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remove the encryption used by the movie industry to protect digital
video disks ("DVDs") against copyists. 247
The ruling was reversed by the California Supreme Court, which
upheld the preliminary injunction against re-publication of the
information. 248  The majority took pains to distinguish Bartnicki,
which it clearly recognized as cutting against injunctive relief.249 The
opinion took comfort from the fact that the Supreme Court "expressly
declined to extend Bartnicki to 'disclosures of trade secrets or domestic
gossip or other information of purely private concern. '"25' This
reassurance was somewhat misplaced, however, because the Bartnicki
Court did not expressly decline for substantive reasons, but rather
because it was following the traditional prudential rule of not reaching
a question until compelled to do so. 2 1' The Bunner Court argued that
publication of the code in question did not raise weighty First
Amendment issues because the publication by Bunner was not
designed to address a matter of public concern. 2  This conclusion was
odd since the face-off between techies and the movie industry over
DVD encryption (which rendered them unplayable on equipment
using the Linux operating system) had frequently been on the front
pages of newspapers across the country.253 In short, although the
majority reached its preferred outcome, it clearly did not find its
results easy to explain in the face of existing free speech precedent.254
In contrast, the Oregon Supreme Court a few years earlier
concluded that the equivalent to the First Amendment in its state
constitution 255 protected the right of a newsletter to publish alleged
247. Id.
248. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 1. The court decided that, although the speech in question
was covered by the First Amendment, the regulation in question was "content-
neutral" and was designed to protect a "significant" governmental interest in the
protection of intellectual property interests. Id. at 7-8.
249. In addition to Bartnicki, the California court also felt compelled to deal with
CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (1994), a case in which Justice Blackmun stayed an
injunction against a television broadcaster, prohibiting the airing of footage at a beef
processing plant that allegedly revealed trade secrets. Bunner, 75 F.3d at 18. Justice
Blackmun concluded that the injunction was an invalid prior restraint. CBS Inc., 510
U.S. at 1318.
250. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 15 (emphasis in original).
251. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001).
252. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 15-16.
253. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Free Speech Rights for Computer Code?, N.Y. Times,
July 31, 2000, at C1.
254. The case may still be determined in favor of defendant Bunner. The majority
remanded to the intermediate appellate court with instructions to decide if the
preliminary injunction was proper under California trade secret law. If the
information was not still legitimately "secret" when Bunner posted it (he is alleged to
have downloaded the material from the Internet, where it was presumably freely
available to all comers), Bunner, 75 P.3d at 7, then it was not protectable and a
preliminary injunction against further dissemination would clearly be improper. Id. at
23 (Moreno, J., concurring).
255. State ex rel. Sports Mgmt. News, Inc. v. Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304, 1309 (Or.
35520041
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
trade secrets of Adidas.256 The Court found that the trade secrecy law
in question was "directed at a 'specific subject of communication,
excluding some speech based on the content of the message' and that
"it, therefore, 'limits the substance of a subject of communication. "'257
Notwithstanding Bunner, a growing number of cases in trade
secrecy law are beginning to follow lines similar to those suggested by
Bartnicki, and in the process provide further support for a claim that
the First Amendment requires some mandatory speech commons.
Information that is either "published" in the sense of being accessible
to anyone who looks for it, or that has in a legitimate way been
discovered by a would-be speaker appears to be freely reusable as a
constitutional right. Once known,258 information becomes embedded
more or less permanently in the free speech commons. While I do not
claim that it is never possible to sanction the use of information, such
instances would be exceptional; the default rule seems to be that, once
factual or other content is in the commons, further restrictions on its
use cannot be imposed.
1996) (citing Or. Const. art. I, § 8). In Bunner, California also rejected the claim that
the preliminary injunction violated the state constitution. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 18.
256. State v. Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304 (Or. 1996).
257. Id. at 1308 (citing Moser v. Frohnmayer, 845 P.2d 1284 (Or. 1993)). There are
other situations, with slightly different facts, that have also raised free speech
questions in relation to trade secrecy protection. In Religious Technology Center v.
Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995), sanctions were sought against the
Washington Post for publishing material that the Post had reason to know that the
Church of Scientology and its Religious Technology Center ("RTC") claimed as trade
secrets. The court refused to find actionable misappropriation on the ground that,
because the material was in open court files and had also been posted to an Internet
site, it was no longer secret. Id. at 1368. The court went on to say, however, that even
if the material had still been secret at the time it was published by The Post, the
newspaper's decision to pursue leads from a whistleblower was legally appropriate:
This Court knows of no law which required The Post to sit on its hands and
do no further investigation into what was obviously becoming a newsworthy
event and newsworthy documents. The RTC's allegations are still just
allegations. The very court from which the Fishman affidavit was obtained
still has under advisement the issue of whether the [Advanced Technology]
documents are trade secrets. Although The Post was on notice that the RTC
made certain proprietary claims about these documents, there was nothing
illegal or unethical about The Post going to the Clerk's office for a copy of
the documents or downloading them from the Internet.
Id. at 1369. In another case, predating these by some two decades, an intermediate
appellate court in New York refused to treat information about possible corporate
wrongdoing as a trade secret simply because a former employee with no formal
contractual obligation not to reveal it had taken the information to the press. KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines v. DeWit, 418 N.Y.S.2d 63 (App. Div. 1979). To treat this
exchange of information as misappropriation of a trade secret, wrote the Court,
"impinges upon the First Amendment restraints and extends beyond the usual,
established legal protection afforded, in prohibiting revelation of information used in
business, which in the hands of a competitor would be either detrimental or give the
competitor an added advantage." Id. at 64.
258. Time does not permit a full exploration of the interesting and important
question of when something is public for purposes of the public domain.
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D. Three Problems for a Constitutional Theory of the Public Domain
The assertion that the First Amendment creates a mandatory public
domain must meet three challenges. First, it must be reconciled with a
small, but significant, body of case law that allows certain intellectual
property interests other than copyright to be created in material that
should be permanently embedded in the public domain. These
include decisions that permit private rights in subject matter ranging
from sound recordings to current news.
The second problem derives from the manner in which the
Rehnquist Court analyzes speech cases. The Court has repeatedly
said that, where the government is pursuing an objective other than
speech regulation, and proceeds in a "content-neutral" way, it enjoys
considerable latitude to restrict speech. 9 Cases adopting this more
lenient approach to speech regulation could be read as a tacit
rejection of a claim that one function of the First Amendment is to
preserve access to and use of content.
Finally, any claims about a constitutionally mandated public domain
must make clear, and be able to defend, their underlying concept of
"freedom" in this context. To be precise, even if the Constitution
requires that access to publicly disclosed content be "free" in the
sense that no one can be required to ask permission to use it, does it
also require the content to be "free" in the economic sense? One
could have a public domain that allows anyone to draw at will from
the speech goods it contains if she so wishes, but requires that she
must pay a toll for that usage. This would be a regime of de facto
compulsory licenses, which, although they do not allow an "owner" to
restrict use, do require potential users to pay it.
1. The "Property Trumps Free Speech" Case Law Problem
In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court made broad assertions about
the existence of a speech commons, 26" but, in doing so, it neither
reconciled nor repudiated a series of earlier decisions that seem to be
259. Perhaps the most famous statement of this idea comes from the opinion
written by Justice Scalia in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). He wrote
that the government could selectively proscribe speech on a particular subject matter
as long as the form of content discrimination was one that posed no realistic threat of
the "official suppression of ideas." Id. at 390. He also noted:
(We cannot think of any First Amendment interest that would stand in the
way of a State's prohibiting only those obscene motion pictures with
blue-eyed actresses.) Save for that limitation, the regulation of "fighting
words," like the regulation of noisy speech, may address some offensive
instances and leave other, equally offensive, instances alone.
Id.
260. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); see
supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
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at odds with the claim that such communicative raw materials as facts
and ideas must be freely available to all.
The most famous of these, International News Service v. Associated
Press,"' recognized a property-like interest in the laborious gathering
of factual information from the World War I battlefields. When a
rival of Associated Press ("AP"), the International News Service
("INS"), took factual data from publicly accessible AP wires and used
that information to file stories for its own subscribers, the Court
classified the behavior as an unfair trade practice and upheld a
preliminary injunction against continuation of the practice.262
Although the Court clearly appreciated that it was on delicate
ground-it admitted that the news of the day was, as it put it,
"ordinarily... publici juris 261-it nevertheless adopted the position
that where the user was also a competitor, a quasi-property right
could be invoked to stop the use in question.
The decision in International News Service could be disposed of on
the ground that it predates the beginning of the era in which the
Supreme Court started to elaborate modern First Amendment
doctrine. That explanation would dispose of International News
Service as valid precedent, but it is not entirely convincing. The Court
has continued to rely on the International News Service decision from
time to time, including it in another case that involved the
dissemination of news. The Justices unanimously reached out in
Carpenter v. United States,2" an insider trading case, to rule, based on
International News Service, that the raw information gathered by a
Wall Street Journal reporter for use in his column could be deemed
the "property" of his employer.265 Thus, when the reporter shared the
261. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
262. Only member papers could carry AP wire copy. This meant that about half of
the country's newspapers were excluded from relying on its reporting. The public
that relied on papers supplied with news by the INS might not have even had AP
papers available in their communities as an alternative. For discussions of the factual
background of the International News Service case, see Douglas G. Baird, Common
Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated
Press, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 411 (1983); Benkler, Constitutional Bounds, supra note 28, at
560-61; Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note 15, at 719-22.
263. Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 234.
264. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
265. Id. at 26-28. Other speech-as-property cases decided by the Court without
consideration of the First Amendment implications are Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (allowing the state to "copyright" sound recordings that were, at
the time, not covered by federal copyright law), and two cases recognizing the validity
of trade secrecy as an intellectual property right. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S.
986 (1984) (holding trade secrets are property for purposes of Takings Clause);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (holding that state trade
secrecy law is not preempted by the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution).
These cases, however, do not present serious challenges to the theory of a First
Amendment public domain posited here. The California case protected a form of
captured expression from piracy; the federal government clearly could have (and
subsequently did) protect this sort of subject matter under its Intellectual Property
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information with friends prior to its publication, he was guilty of
misappropriating valuable property.266
In at least two other instances, material one might have expected to
fall squarely into the First Amendment common, based on the earlier
discussion, was treated as intellectual property. In these cases, unlike
International News Service and Carpenter, explicit First Amendment
challenges were raised and disposed of by the Justices. In Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,267 for example, the Court
concluded that a right of publicity action could be brought, consistent
with the First Amendment, against a television station. The
broadcaster had aired film footage, taken out-of-doors at a fair, of a
"human cannonball" being shot through the air. As it did in
International News Service, the Court again held that "news"
legitimately observed and recorded by reporters was subject to control
of a private owner and could not be used without permission. The
case was unusual on its facts because what was "taken" was the
performer's entire fifteen-second act, rather than, as in the classic
publicity rights case, an aspect of Zacchini's persona, such as his name
or a picture of his face. 68 The case was also striking because, again
unlike the typical publicity case, the use at issue was not for
advertising purposes-the most widely agreed-upon violation of
publicity rights269-but for news reporting.
A second decision that runs contrary to the posited existence of a
mandatory public domain is San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee.27 ° Here, the Court upheld a federal
law giving the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) the
exclusive right to use the word "Olympic" in relation to a sporting
event. The statute in question gave USOC ownership of the word
even as against sporting events whose use of it did not give rise to
consumer confusion. The law was challenged on constitutional
grounds by the organizers of what was then known as the Gay
Olympics. Their claim was that vesting such extensive control over a
Clause powers. Monsanto and Kewanee seem entirely consistent with other aspects of
First Amendment doctrine, recognizing that individuals and entities do not merely
enjoy the right to speak, but also the right not to speak. This line of precedent was
explicitly connected to intellectual property in Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559-60, to
explain why strong protection for a right of first publication under copyright was
consistent with First Amendment principles.
266. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27. In a third case, Goldstein, the Court permitted
California to create state copyright in sound recordings, although they were not then
protected under federal law. 412 U.S. at 571.
267. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
268. Id. at 575-76.
269. See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §
28:1 (2001); Madow, supra note 224, at 147-78; J. Thomas McCarthy, Human Persona
as Commercial Property, 19 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 129, 131 (1995); Zimmerman,
Right of Publicity, supra note 224, at 57-58.
270. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
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descriptive word in the hands of a single entity was a free speech
violation. The Court responded rather blandly that barring the
defendants from using the word "Olympics" was not unconstitutional
because it was merely an "incidental" effect of a law intended to
effectuate a valid state purpose: rewarding those who create value by
an expenditure of time, money, and effort with a property right.27'
Although these cases are few in number, and caged in by limiting
language, they nonetheless provide support for the contrary claim that
freedom of speech is quite compatible with awards of private rights
over who can use "their" speech goods and how. There are, however,
other ways of thinking about these cases that might reduce their
challenge to the thesis laid out in this Article.
The first is to argue that the whole in this area is greater than the
sum of its parts-that this tiny number of cases simply represents the
occasional doctrinal wrong turn, and is too insignificant to outweigh
the evidence in favor of a mandatory public domain. Another way to
understand these cases is to say that they are relevant only to special
instances where a particularized and substantial harm of the sort that
the state has a serious interest in preventing has been identified. It is
true that the Court saw some of these fact patterns as posing high risks
of market failure. That is because the defendant's activities were
interpreted as undercutting the plaintiff's financial rewards to such an
extent that he or she might well be deterred from continuing to
engage in a socially desirable (usually expressive) activity.272
This argument was made express in Zacchini, where the Court
argued that performers and producers of live events would go out of
business if they could not prevent appropriation of most, if not all, of
their revenue stream by those who paid no part of the expenses of
putting on the production. If broadcasters were permitted to show
Mr. Zacchini's entire performance without paying him, or if television
cameras could transmit sporting events without permission so that the
public could enjoy the event without buying tickets, communicative
activities and entertainment would diminish in number. The concern
about potential destruction of markets might also explain why, in
271. Id. at 532. The Court went on to say:
The SFAA's expressive use of the word cannot be divorced from the value
the USOC's efforts have given to it. The mere fact that the SFAA claims an
expressive, as opposed to a purely commercial, purpose does not give it a
First Amendment right to "appropriat[e] to itself the harvest of those who
have sown." The USOC's right to prohibit use of the word "Olympic" in the
promotion of athletic events is at the core of its legitimate property right.
Id. at 541 (citations omitted). For a critique of this case, see Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65
Notre Dame L. Rev. 397 (1990).
272. Some suggestions about ways to limit these precedents have been made in
Baker, First Amendment, supra note 50, at 945-51; Benkler, Constitutional Bounds,
supra note 28, at 555-56; and Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note 15, at
725-39.
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International News Service, the Court conceded complete freedom to
members of the general public to reuse the facts in AP's news articles
but limited INS's ability to do so until AP was able to secure at least
some minimal level of returns from its effort.273
On the other hand, it must be said that this justification for
regulating speech does not seem to rise to the level of significance that
the Court has historically required as a precondition for either
enjoining or punishing other kinds of speech.274  Private economic
injury is not generally recognized as a compelling reason to regulate
speech. Nor does the market failure rationale do much to explain the
result in the Gay Olympics case. Thus, it is not, I freely admit, wholly
and entirely satisfying.
2. The Public Concern Theory and the Categorical Approach to Free
Speech Analysis
Another important problem for the argument that the First
Amendment requires a mandatory public domain lies in the analytic
strategy the Court, particularly over the last decade, has used when it
decides free speech questions. The model currently in favor seems on
its face not to take content seriously as an independent speech
value.275 Instead, the Court has chosen, rather formalistically, to
273. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); see also Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (allowing state law to prevent piracy of sound
recordings). This understanding of the International News Service case is adopted by
the American Law Institute in its Restatement of Unfair Competition. See
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 38 (1995). It also underpins the
decision in NBA v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[T]he extra
elements... that allow a 'hot news' claim to survive preemption are: (i) the time-
sensitive value of factual information, (ii) the free-riding by a defendant, and (iii) the
threat to the very existence of the product or service provided by the plaintiff."). In
many ways, the facts of International News Service as related in the opinion and the
dissent do not lay out a completely compelling case of dire need; however, the issue is
not whether we are convinced that the borrowing was a market-destructive practice,
but whether the Court so perceived it.
274. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (holding that the
interest in personal privacy is not sufficiently significant to outweigh free speech
rights). A possible counter-example, however, is defamation case law, where the right
to recover for defamatory falsehoods has been preserved, although greatly limited by
constitutional privileges. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that
government officials may recover only for knowing falsehoods); Gertz v. Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that private figures may recover for negligent
defamation). Here it is unclear whether the interest in reputation outweighs the
interest in freedom of speech, or if harmful, false speech is simply outside the
protection of the First Amendment altogether.
275. So vigilant was the Court in the past to prevent this effect that it developed
constitutional privileges for defamatory falsehoods specifically to avoid the risk,
indirectly, of chilling protected speech by punishing speech that was not protected.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278-79. The strict standards for testing obscenity, similarly, were
intended to create a broad enough safety zone so that protected speech would not be
impeded. See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (establishing
procedural protections to prevent regulatory spillover to protected works).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
classify government regulations of speech into a set of a priori
categories. Once the restriction has been classified as to type, fixed
rules of decision can then be applied that seem largely to disregard the
nature of what is being said, or the general effect of a restriction on
speech activities. While the scope of this article does not permit
detailed discussion of this analytical approach, a brief description will
quickly reveal its relevance to public domain theory."6
Simply put, the Court has developed graduated levels of
constitutional scrutiny for regulations that impinge on speech, closely
mimicking those used to decide equal protection cases. 2 77 Content-
based regulations are severely scrutinized (and rarely survive the
process), particularly if they favor or disfavor speech based on the
point of view being expressed 8.27  The analytical status of a second
kind of content-based discrimination, one which targets speech based
on its subject matter, is less clear. It is difficult to predict accurately
whether such instances of regulation will be subject to strict or
intermediate scrutiny because the line between laws that restrict
content, and ones that are content-neutral, turns out to be quite
uncertain. 9
Regulation of speech that the Court classifies as content-neutral or
that, although content-based, is intended to further "an important or
substantial governmental interest.., unrelated to the suppression of
free expression, "280 is subjected to a form of intermediate scrutiny
276. For a fuller and insightful discussion of current First Amendment analysis, see
C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and
Presses, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 57, 114-27 [hereinafter Baker, Turner Broadcasting] and
Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 615 (1991).
277. Daniel D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law-
Substance and Procedure § 18.3 (3d ed. 1999).
278. The distinction between content-neutral and content-based regulation is
acknowledged by the Court to be problematic. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S.
514, 526 (2001); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994). For a
recent example of one court's struggle over how to distinguish a content-based from a
content-neutral rule, see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d
294, 328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd sub nom. Universal City Studios Inc. v. Corley, 273
F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). Although the regulation at issue was directed at the
suppression of a particular category of content, the court ruled that the regulation was
nevertheless content-neutral because it neither favored nor disfavored a particular
viewpoint. Id.
279. Compare Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105 (1991) (restrictions based on content, whether aimed at a particular viewpoint,
are subject to strict scrutiny), with Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 662 (making clear
that strict scrutiny applies to viewpoint discrimination, but leaving uncertain whether
or not mere regulation by category of content is subject to the highest level of scrutiny
or only to intermediate scrutiny). Turner Broadcasting has subsequently been read as
saying that only viewpoint discrimination is "content-based." Universal City Studios,
Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d at 328-29 (relying on Turner Broadcasting in ruling that
restrictions on the communication of computer code used to control access to
digitalized versions of copyrighted works are "content-neutral"). See supra note 278.
280. Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391
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comparable to the quite flexible standard applied in the commercial
speech cases. 81 This means that, although the substantiality of the
government objective and the fit between that objective and the
means chosen to achieve it will be considered, the importance of the
content of the speech to the individual or to discourse on matters of
public concern will not.z82 The latter of the two classes of speech
regulations subjected to intermediate scrutiny is the more troubling
because it can, in theory, lead to an entire area of content being
placed off limits as long as the purpose of doing so is to achieve a
"legitimate" end other than pure and simple suppression of speech.
2 83
Intermediate scrutiny of speech regulation was originally
introduced to deal with cases involving the regulation of behavior that
carried with it communicative overtones.2 4  If the restriction
addressed some non-speech consequence of the behavior, then it was
likely to pass muster. Subsequently, this approach was extended to
cover regulation of "adult" entertainment on the grounds that the
government purpose in regulating purveyors of pornography was not
U.S. 367,377 (1968)).
281. The Supreme Court adopted a form of intermediate scrutiny for commercial
speech in 1980. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980). The application of the so-called Central Hudson test, has, however,
been extremely variable, and includes instances in which the scrutiny given to the
regulation is fairly minimal and highly deferential toward the state. See Posadas de
P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986). Its range has also extended
to cases where the law in question is subjected to rigorous scrutiny. See, e.g., 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). Similarly, intermediate
scrutiny for content-neutral regulations of speech has tended to result in a very
forgiving attitude by the Supreme Court toward such regulation. See Williams, supra
note 276, at 623 (referring to the analysis in question as resulting in a "fairly lenient
[standard]"). But see Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 514 (applying a quite rigorous scrutiny to a
content-neutral rule).
282. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 430 (1990)
(even if an exception to enforcement of the regulation could be made without harm to
the basic purposes of the rule and enforcement has substantial impact on expressive
activities, application of a uniform rule is permitted).
283. Some of the risks this approach poses for First Amendment interests were laid
out by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Boos v. Barry. 485 U.S. 312, 335-
38 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Court in
Boos rejected the government's argument that its restrictions on protests near foreign
embassies were content-neutral and subject only to intermediate scrutiny. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote separately to point out that such an
outcome was by no means foreordained by the Court's precedent. By allowing the
level of scrutiny to vary, depending on whether the Court concluded that a law was
intended to restrict speech or instead intended to address secondary effects of the
speech, the outcome would turn on a judgment that was, by its nature, often a matter
of nothing more than guesswork and conjecture. See generally Baker, Turner
Broadcasting, supra note 276.
284. The prototypical example is O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367, a case involving a
prohibition on destroying draft cards. Burning one's draft card was a favored form of
political protest during the Vietnam war. This sort of case is often called a symbolic
speech case and it is argued that the regulation can be justified as a regulation of an
action because it is aimed at the effects of speech, and not at the message itself.
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a desire to restrict protected speech, but rather an effort to combat its
"secondary effects." '285
The third analytic category is reserved for laws of general
applicability (that is, laws that do not, on their face, address speech at
all, even when, as applied, they may severely restrict it). Such laws are
tested under a minimalistic rational basis test,286 and in contrast to
those in the strict scrutiny category, rarely fail to be upheld.
The shift to tiered First Amendment analysis is problematic in a
number of regards, but it is potentially fatal to a public domain theory
that relies heavily on the claim that content itself, and the ability to
use it, is an independent value protected by the Free Speech Clause.
Certainly, much of the scholarship exploring the interface between
intellectual property and the First Amendment, as well as some recent
judicial opinions, struggles to answer questions about ownership of
intangibles by wrestling to fit their conclusions within this form of
analysis. 87  The implications are, by and large, discouraging. By
following the three-tiered approach, for example, one might feel
compelled to conclude that, if a content-neutral regulation
"reasonably" furthers a "significant" state interest, such as protection
of personal privacy or the provision of economic incentives to
encourage production of speech goods, the regulation (and the
intellectual property right it creates) is constitutional. This approach
would, of course, render irrelevant any independent consideration of
285. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986).
286. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). In Cohen, the
Court said a plaintiff, whose identity was disclosed in violation of a promise not to do
so, could invoke the state law on promissory estoppel. Id. at 665. This was allowed
even though the result would be to punish the sort of speech that is ordinarily entitled
to the highest degree of First Amendment protection: information about an election
campaign and one candidate's attempt to play political "dirty tricks" on the opposing
candidate. Because the law applied was one of general applicability, not one directed
specifically at speech, the Court merely used the equivalent of a rational relationship
test -that is, it did not scrutinize the impact on speech at all. The refusal to consider
the impact of the application of a generally applicable rule on speech has led litigants
to ask courts to stretch tort principles like trespass, intrusion, and breach of loyalty to
punish the process by which information is gathered as a surrogate for punishing the
communication itself. Among some recent examples of this phenomenon are Food
Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (arising from an
investigative report on claims of unsanitary conditions and deceptive sales practices in
a supermarket chain where supermarket sued reporters for fraud, trespass, and
breach of loyalty), and Sanders v. American Broadcasting Cos., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal.
1999) (involving a television expos6 of psychic telemarketing industry; reporter
successfully sued for intrusion into a "private" area for using a hidden camera to
record events in an office).
287. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd sub nom. Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001). For examples of scholars who have struggled to make the best of a First
Amendment analysis inside the Turner Broadcasting straightjacket, see Benkler,
Through the Looking Glass, supra note 35, at 197 and Netanel, supra note 50.
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the value of the content in question, either to those who wish to use it
in their own speech, or to those who wish to hear it.
Interestingly, however, recent evidence suggests that the three-
tiered approach to speech regulation may not so clearly refute the
analysis suggested by this Article. Bartnicki288 is a sign that the First
Amendment interest in access to the raw material of speech continues
to be highly significant to a majority of the Court.
The case was certainly one where the odds were high that, under
the three-tiered approach, the rule in question would be upheld. A
ban on the republication of the contents of intercepted telephone calls
is subject matter-neutral, and was designed not for the purpose of
limiting speech, but rather to serve the state's legitimate interest in
protecting personal privacy. But the case was not analyzed that way;
indeed, the opinion did not even address the question of the
"appropriate" level of scrutiny.289 Instead, the majority seemed tacitly
to apply strict scrutiny, following an old, familiar line of reasoning:
Justice Stevens simply asserted that publication of "truthful
information of public concern" was fully protected, as long as the
defendants did nothing illegal in acquiring the tape.290  "[P]rivacy
concerns," he wrote, "give way when balanced against the interest in
publishing matters of public importance.,
291
Clearly, Bartnicki goes far toward reinvigorating the argument that
the First Amendment foundation for a mandatory public domain
remains sound. But it is not the only evidence that content retains
affirmative importance in the eyes of the Court, notwithstanding the
use of three-tiered scrutiny. The recent history of commercial speech
cases is also quite suggestive.
In 1986, the Court agreed that Puerto Rico's decision to prohibit
advertising of its casinos to its own citizens was a legitimate regulation
288. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
289. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, was highly critical of the majority for
abandoning the three-tier approach in this case, arguing that intermediate scrutiny
was appropriate and should have resulted in the law being upheld. Id. at 541-56. The
majority agrees, he wrote, that the statutes in question are "content-neutral laws of
general applicability" and that the government has a substantial interest in privacy.
Id. at 544. Thus, he argued, "[t]here is scant support, either in precedent or in reason,
for the Court's tacit application of strict scrutiny." Id.
290. Id. at 534. Justice Stevens acknowledged that a law that prevented any use of
the content of the tapes might further the nonspeech objective of discouraging illegal
interceptions, but despite this "legitimate nonspeech" objective, ruled that the means
selected by the government to achieve its goal were unconstitutional. Id. at 535. The
Court set aside for purposes of this case the broader issue of whether application of
the statute would have been permissible if what had been disclosed was "trade secrets
or domestic gossip or other information of purely private concern." Id. at 533.
291. Id. at 534. As noted earlier, the concurrence by Justices Breyer and O'Connor
could have somewhat undercut the argument that Barnicki revives public concern as a
test because they emphasized the importance of the nature of the plaintiffs ("limited
public figures"), id. at 539, and the fact that the content involved public affairs. Id.
But after so writing, both joined the majority opinion.
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of commercial speech, despite the fact that it was an attempt to censor
discussion of one particular kind of truthful content.292 The Court
clearly was unconvinced that the content was especially valuable, and
seemed at the time untroubled by the attempt to control access of an
audience to it. A decade later, however, the Court repudiated that
decision and embarked on a course of commercial speech analysis that
seems explicitly to recognize the independent significance of content
as a free speech value. Starting with Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. ,293
the Court has reiterated the importance of freedom to communicate
accurate content, and the crucial role such content plays, both in
individual decision making and as a foundation for discourse on
matters of public concern.294
When these pieces of evidence are put together, it seems plausible
that, despite some twists in the path, the case for a mandatory public
domain that rests on the importance of content to the First
Amendment remains viable. Thus, unless illegitimate means of
acquisition are at issue, or the law of copyrights and patents can
properly be invoked, interferences with the reutilization of kinds of
content are likely to be invalid, even if the Court in other situations
continues to uphold interferences with speech that occur in pursuit of
other regulatory goals.
3. The Compulsory License as a Way to Privatize Speech While
Respecting First Amendment Values
One of the most interesting and difficult questions to answer in
thinking about the public domain, its nature, and its First Amendment
status is whether or not to draw a distinction between freedom to use
and a right to use for free.295 This distinction is now attracting the
292. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
293. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
294. See id. at 481-82. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496-97
(1996), the majority relied on the passage from Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), to the effect that:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the
free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
Id. at 765.
The Court made a similar point about the importance of the availability of
information in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002).
295. Professor Lessig has pointed out that an important distinction exists between
freedom to utilize content without prior permission or the possibility of exclusion, and
the right not to pay for it. Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 Duke
L.J. 1783, 1788-90 (2002); Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 Fla. L. Rev.
763, 772-73 (2003). The distinction is also discussed usefully and at length in Boyle,
The Second Enclosure Movement, supra note 1, at 61-69. Cf. Tom W. Bell, Fair Use
vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use
Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557 (1998) (suggesting that copyright owners might
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attention of scholars engaged in defining various meanings of the term
"public domain. ' 296 But the question was presaged long ago by the
Supreme Court in Zacchini.297 In the course of deciding the Human
Cannonball's right to sue a news broadcaster for televising an entire
performance of his act, the majority commented in passing that it saw
a distinction between his claim to be paid for his performance and a
claim-not present in that instance-of a right to an injunction.298 The
latter would have troubled the Court in a way that the former did not.
To understand this distinction, one might say that the First
Amendment is offended by restrictions on the right to use content,
but not by requirements to pay for it. Does this mean that even if a
mandatory public domain does exist, the First Amendment still allows
the speech goods to be subjected to some form of compulsory license?
Statutory compulsory licenses have been used in copyright, for
example, to provide composers with payment for use of their music
while depriving them of control over who uses it. In the context of a
property regime, compulsory licenses are generally thought of as a
device that increases access to works while respecting the economic
interests of authors in being paid.
The idea of a metered public domain, however, is intuitively
uncomfortable, and I suspect quite alien to the understanding that
animates the work of most scholars in the field.299 This statement does
voluntarily give up the right to control kinds of uses made of their work in return for
automatic payment for each use); Hess & Ostrom, supra note 1, at 121-23 (pointing
out the variety of regulatory regimes that are consistent with the existence of a
commons).
296. See, e.g., supra note 1.
297. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
298. Id. at 573-74. A comment with a somewhat similar import appears in Harper
& Row. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57
(1985). In that case, the defendant argued that it had a First Amendment right to
publish the news even if it trumped an author's right of first publication under
copyright. Id. The majority, in ruling against The Nation, pointed out that the
publication of the infringing article occurred while the book itself was "poised" for
public release and therefore could not be excused by any pressing need for public
access. Id. at 557. The Court then emphasized that it might have viewed the First
Amendment arguments in the case differently had the copyright owner tried to use
his "monopoly as an instrument to suppress facts." Id. at 559. Jane Ginsburg has
taken up this idea in an article on permissible protections for data. Ginsburg, No
"Sweat"?, supra note 109. She suggests a number of ways that protection of data
could be made consistent with free speech principles, one of which is the use of a
compulsory licensing mechanism. Id. "This device ensures other compilers access to
the information, albeit for a fee. Once access is available, however, the First
Amendment does not necessarily command that it be gratis." Id. at 386-87.
299. Benkler, for instance, emphasizes that the public domain is "free as the air to
common use," and seems to mean by that that it is free from an economic as well as a
use perspective. See Benkler, Free as the Air, supra note 1. In his most recent article
on the public domain, he comes closer to making this notion explicit when he writes
that the proper role of the First Amendment is to "stem the expanding range of rights
to control information that are intended to sustain the business model of selling
information as goods." Benkler, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 35, at 223; see
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not quarrel with the idea that there may be legitimate reasons to
expect people to pay for access to works in the public domain. First of
all, individuals can always agree to pay for the right to reuse
something, even if, absent the agreement, the Constitution would give
them unrestricted rights to use it. Contractual arrangements that
allow compilers of information to be paid for their work are not
inherently suspect.
Also, the costs associated with the packaging of speech goods may
legitimately be recovered by the packager. Here, of course, the
charge is not for the content but its embodiment on paper. The fact,
for example, that Moby Dick is in the public domain does not mean
that anyone who wishes to do so can simply pick up the physical
object in which it is embodied and walk off with it for free. Similarly,
one who provides a theater to show films may charge for access, and a
would-be patron cannot obtain a free seat simply because the movie in
question is now in the public domain.
Nevertheless, the intuition that a compulsory fee violates the First
Amendment is distinguishable and defensible. We recognize, for
example, that the price tags that unavoidably attach to accessing
speech goods (including the cost of school tuition, the funding of
libraries and so on) have an underside. They contribute to inevitable
wealth-based informational disparities among members of society.
Access conditioned on ability to pay can lead to distortions that
offend our norms of individual equality, and that impede the
possibility of fully realizing individual potential. Disparities in
exposure to speech goods can also lead to inefficient results for the
overall society. Education, learning, and the production of new work
are among the benefits of exposure to a wealth of sources of
information. Thus, free access and free use both produce positive
social externalities. When, however, individuals can neither shift the
costs of access onto others nor defray it themselves, knowledge and
creativity spill-overs for society are diminished. For these reasons,
wealthier and more democratic countries devote large amounts of
their public resources to equalize the intellectual playing field by
funding public education and stocking public libraries.
Any compulsory fee that attaches to the use of content, once
legitimately acquired, could be plausibly conceived of as a "burden" in
also Lange, Recognizing, supra note 35, at 150. Lange quotes William Krasilovsky in
saying that public domain is "best defined in negative terms" and that "[it lacks the
private property element granted under copyright in that there is no legal right to
exclude others from enjoying it and is 'free as the air to common use."' Id. at 151 n.20.
In most of the writing about the public domain, the issue is even less explicitly
discussed. This is because most authors start from the assumption that being in the
public domain means that the speech good is free of charge as well as free to use. See,
e.g., Jaszi, supra note 30; Litman, supra note 35. This, after all, was the general
understanding about the status of expressive works once copyright ran out, and the
context in which most thinking about the public domain occurred.
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much the same way it would be a "burden" to require private
permission for the use. This is so given the importance of learning,
thinking and sharing ideas to social welfare and our understanding of
the value of free speech. Because of the exceptional circumstances of
the case, Zacchini may have posed enough of a risk of market failure
that the burden imposed on the broadcaster was warranted. 30 0 The
broadcaster was required to help subsidize Zacchini's costs as a quid
pro quo for the use of his act.301 It is difficult to imagine, however,
that the First Amendment would generally be indifferent to property
or quasi-property rights that routinely allow private parties to subject
information to a wealth burden. To do so would mean that anyone
writing about or depicting Zacchini and his act could be required to
pay for the right to disseminate information about the act, even if they
do not broadcast it in its entirety. This outcome is inconsistent both
with the goals of promoting individual autonomy and protecting the
full and free discussion of matters of public concern. It would, in
effect, permit the law to "prefer" the speech activities of the rich over
the poor, and promote self-censorship to boot.
Perhaps the most thoughtful observation on this issue was made by
Professor Edwin Baker in a recent article. Although the context was
different, the point is sound in this setting as well. Baker wrote:
"[S]peech freedom is a liberty-not a market-right. Freedom of
speech gives a person a right to say what she wants. It does not give
the person a right to charge a price for the opportunity to hear or
receive her speech."3 2 Thus, a compulsory license attached to the
reutilization of legally obtained content might pit a policy preference
(rewarding private owners) against a constitutional right to speak.
Such a right to payment can be sustained over the constitutional right
to speak, if at all, only on the rarest of occasions and only to the extent
necessary to prevent serious harm. It cannot be sustained as a
generally acceptable burden on speech rights.
Having said this, I freely admit that the subject is one where the
existing doctrine is of little help. It deserves much greater thought
and discussion than I and others have thus far given it. The
relationship between speech and payment is the most troubling aspect
of public domain theory and also the part that is least well-developed,
in a field of real competitors.
After considering all three of the possible impediments to a First
Amendment right to use content-I hope fairly-I recognize that the
affirmative case for a mandatory public domain is not perfect. But it
is nonetheless strong. The negatives, on balance, do not seem
powerful enough to warrant betting against taking the Harper & Row
300. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 562.
301. See id. at 578.
302. Baker, First Amendment, supra note 50, at 903.
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language that some information must stay in the public domain other
than with complete seriousness.303 Both the logic behind free speech
and the Court's commitment to the protection of public discourse
suggest that this is the appropriate conclusion.
IV. WHAT DOES THE MANDATORY PUBLIC DOMAIN CONTAIN?
Having concluded that, on balance, the case for the existence of a
mandatory public domain is plausible, the final issue to address is
what sorts of things the public domain I posit would contain.3°4 It is
impossible, without making this Article into a book, to do full justice
to this question. Rather, what follows is an attempt to sketch the
outlines of the public domain's contents and to note some of the issues
that the mandatory public domain theory, if valid, raises for the
future.
To frame the examination, I will start with the following prediction.
First, whatever the mandatory public domain holds, there is a baseline
presumption that its contents can be used without permission and
without charge. Second, very little will end up in the public domain as
a result of an affirmative requirement that it be put there. Only a very
limited amount of information must be contributed to the public, and
everything in that limited category comes from government sources
such as criminal trials and reports of Congressional proceedings.
For the most part, however, information that becomes part of the
mandatory public domain does so by routes that are not themselves
"mandatory." Disclosures do not have to be made. Manuscripts need
not be shared. Secrets can be kept. But once the content is no longer
held under conditions of "seclusion," it becomes part of the "public
domain" and at that point is available to be used by any third party
who learns of it through legally acceptable means.3 5 Normally,
303. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547.
304. I am sensitized to the need to define what I mean by the public domain by the
work of Marci Hamilton, who has complained that those who argue that information
should be "free" too often fail to specify exactly what they mean by information, and
how much of it they intend to include. Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to Professor
Benkler, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 605, 611-13 (2000).
305. The public domain would not, therefore, contain the fruits of illicit spying,
genuine secrets, or information shared only with limited parties on a need-to-know
basis (for example, pursuant to narrowly tailored confidentiality agreements) because
this sort of information is not "public." This Article does not purport, however, to
define in the space available a proposed dividing line between legally and illegally
acquired information, or to probe the limits of secrecy as a barrier to information
entering the public domain. The subject of secrecy and secrecy agreements is difficult
because if they were used routinely, nothing would enter the public domain.
Particularly if one is inclined, as I am, to think that the public domain is a requirement
of the First Amendment, too generous a use of "secrecy" as a reason to classify
information as private could be constitutionally problematic. For an excellent
discussion of secrecy agreements and the First Amendment, see Alan E. Garfield,
Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 261
(1998). For a discussion of the legality or illegality of information gathering, see
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therefore, information will become "public" and freely available for
reuse as a result of some volitional (although not necessarily
voluntary)3 6 act by the source.30 7 This category of speech goods will
include material inserted into public records or otherwise released by
the government. It will also include private sector content drawn
from events, conversations, and activities that occur in a sufficiently
public manner that others can experience them without committing
crimes or trespasses. Factual data and ideas can also enter the public
domain once they have been disclosed to the public in some way, and
cease to be closely held as "secrets."
Once speech goods are publicly available,3"8 those who "know"
them are privileged, absent contractual obligations to the contrary or
protection from copyright or patent law, to utilize and recommunicate
them unencumbered by any proprietary restrictions. Thus, names in a
telephone directory, or information in an encyclopedia, once
published, can be said to "belong" to anyone who buys, borrows or
browses through these works. Also included among the kinds of
material that will be in the mandatory part of the public domain are
such fundamental building blocks of speech such as: words used in
their denotative and descriptive sense (although prevention of
consumer confusion can allow reasonable levels of protection for use
as trademarks),3 9 factual material, and the sorts of things that
Zimmerman, I Spy, supra note 160.
306. The victim of an automobile accident or a serious crime may be found to have
"donated" information to the public domain, even though her participation could
scarcely be deemed voluntary.
307. This can occur if content is either purposefully communicated in ways that
make it available to the general public, or if, in some other way, it has become public.
308. By publicly available, I mean that the information has been disseminated to
persons under no express contractual responsibility not to reveal it to others. As
already indicated I do not mean to suggest that contracts can be used at will to keep
information from becoming "public"; the use of contract to restrict speech is a
complex issue that requires more consideration than can be given here. See supra note
305. I would argue that contracts may appropriately be used to restrict dissemination
in at least some circumstances. If, however, through breach of such an agreement, a
third party learns the information, I would argue at that point, the information has
fallen into the public domain. This analysis is quite consistent with the rules
governing trade secrets, and is one sensible way to mark the outside boundaries of
contract as a limit on free use and reuse of information. The idea that material
becomes public property once it is made public is entirely consistent with historical
ideas about the public domain. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text; see also
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 The Writings
of Thomas Jefferson, supra note 22, at 180.
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive
property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an
individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the
moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and
the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.
Id.
309. As noted earlier recognition of trademarks as identifiers of the source of
goods or services predates the Constitution, and it would be odd, in my view, to argue
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individuals can pick up with their own sensory apparatus without
spying or illicit prying (for example, the appearance of another human
being, or of the physical elements on a public street). The mandatory
public domain also contains all expression whose copyright term has
run out, 310 and original expression that, for one reason or another,
failed to acquire, or lost, statutory copyright by some failure to comply
with the applicable law.'
What is "mandatory" about this public domain, in sum, is that what
goes into it must stay there. The facts about the physical composition
of water, for example, cannot be freely usable today, but available
only by license from a private or public entity tomorrow. One may be
allowed to extract money from would-be users as a precondition for
the release of the information. Once, however, speech goods are
released in ways that give the public actual or constructive awareness
of them, they must remain public goods, except to the extent that they
violate copyright or patent law, or cause some cognizable harm that
the government is entitled to prevent or redress. This one-way ratchet
means that even some aspects of current copyright law itself may be
unconstitutional. For example, restoration of copyright for foreign
works that had previously fallen into the public domain is suspect,
both because the provisions that do this may violate the limited times
provision of the Intellectual Property Clause, as well as First
Amendment norms.
For restrictions on the use of content in the public domain to be
legitimate, the justification for doing so should be a government
interest of a very high order, and the harm a highly particularized and
plausible one. National security needs may mean that one cannot
disclose the location of a particular troop carrier today, but not that
one may never do so. In short, where the use of legitimately obtained,
constitutionally protected content is involved, the kind of scrutiny the
that a constitutional theory of the public domain precludes continued recognition of
them, at least for such limited purposes as identifying the source or preventing
consumer fraud. See supra note 17.
310. But see Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C.
2004). Relying on Eldred, the court concluded that the First Amendment could
constrain the power of Congress to make laws governing speech goods that are the
proper subject matter of copyright if the law in question altered the "traditional
contours of copyright protection." Id. at 119 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
221 (2003)). The court cited numerous historical examples of what it deemed to have
been unchallenged "restorations" of copyright and seems to have relied on that
history to conclude that the restoration provided for in 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000) did
not therefore work a change of this kind. Luck's Music Library, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d
at 113-16.
311. Since the Copyright Act of 1976, works are automatically copyrighted upon
fixation in tangible form. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Before the 1976 Act, copyright came
into being upon publication with a copyright notice attached. See Schechter &
Thomas, supra note 77, at 28. Although unpublished works enjoyed protection under
common law, works that did not comply with the notice requirements of the federal
statute were injected upon publication into the public domain. See id. at 157-58.
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Court applied in Bartnicki3' 2 is the one that should be applied to
restrictions on reuse. Nameless though that standard was in the case,
it looked very much like old-fashioned strict scrutiny. Assuming that
regimes designed to prevent market failure or business-destroying
unfair competition could, and sometimes should, pass such a test, they
would need to be narrowly crafted and directed toward plausible,
rather than highly speculative, threats.
Because the Court has long treated speech that is both false and
harmful as outside the ambit of the Free Speech Clause, the public
domain theory articulated here would seem entirely consistent with
traditional functions of trademark, that is, to prevent harm to
companies and consumers from misleading uses of words and
symbols. On the other hand, it is likely to require severe paring back
of the current law on dilution. These are but a few examples of how
the recognition of a public domain necessary for meaningful speech
rights to survive might play out in revising and refining our ideas of
what intellectual property law can and cannot achieve.
Some will find the theory here an insufficiently radical view of the
public domain because, although it captures much of our common
sense intuition about how the free availability of speech goods
intersects with our ability to communicate, it does not necessarily
guarantee us a "perfect" public domain from their policy perspective.
Others may find it radical because of the idea that there is an absolute
limit on what can be subjected to intellectual property regimes. As
the scope and role of the mandatory public domain is further fleshed
out over time, most claims that publicity rights have been violated, or
that noncompetitors have wrongfully disseminated legitimately
obtained trade secrets will likely fall by the wayside. Trademark
rights will be limited to prevention of consumer confusion and false
designations of origin. The permissible scope of database legislation
will be greatly restricted, if not altogether eliminated. Expression that
has either failed to acquire, or has run out of, copyright protection
would necessarily become a public resource. In short, this theory
sharply defines the outer edges of possibility for intellectual property
and limits the scope of decisions that can rest purely on public policy
determinations.
CONCLUSION
The public domain has customarily been spoken of in the legal
literature as an important value, and one that, at least in theory, has
been recognized as essential both to theories of innovation and to
constitutional principles of free speech. Unfortunately or not, we
have passed the time when abstract testimonials to intellectual
productivity and freedom to communicate are sufficient unto
312. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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themselves as a means of protecting the public domain. If the public
domain is indeed central, then it must at least be anchored by
mainstream constitutional jurisprudence for us to be certain that it can
resist erosion and replacement by private markets.
The Intellectual Property Clause, I posit, is likely to offer part, but
only part, of that anchorage. The most certain contribution of the
Intellectual Property Clause to a mandatory public domain is the
limited time provision that insists that all federally-protected works
eventually become fully and freely available. Other contributions
remain more questionable.
This Article, therefore, explores a second, rich source of potential
protection for the public domain, derived from the First Amendment.
While the claim that the First Amendment provides for a mandatory
commons is also not entirely free of problems, the evidence, on
balance, is that the Justices, whatever their overall persuasions on
speech issues, have consistently shared a belief that freedom of speech
incorporates some form of mandatory public domain. Although no
case has ever ruled directly that the public domain is required by the
First Amendment, this is not fatal to the claim. Professor Vincent
Blasi once wrote, while discussing the likelihood that the First
Amendment incorporates some affirmative rights to information, that
''any central norm of the first amendment relating to the right to know
would derive largely from long-held operating assumptions rather
than from historically significant resolution of hard-fought
disputes., 313 Indeed, that was ultimately how the public's right to
attend criminal trials was derived.
It is not radical to claim, therefore, that long-standing assumptions
about the centrality of a rich public domain to free speech will also
ultimately lead to formal recognition of the principle. That the
assumptions are long-standing can be seen both from the historical
background of intellectual property and free speech law, and from a
century's worth of elaboration of the newsworthiness standard in
common law privacy tort cases. In particular, Bartnicki3 4 has gone far
to give new life to the argument that First Amendment jurisprudence
explicitly values content for its own sake. Thus, the tools needed to
effectuate the assurances in Harper & Row315 about the public domain
remain close at hand. The alternative-a society that values free
speech and learning, but permits most of the valuable raw materials of
speech to be privately owned in the interests of efficiency, or because
information originators want more incentives, or because they
"deserve" them-leads us in a direction that is deeply inconsistent
with the values embodied in free speech. Contemplating the costs
313. Blasi, supra note 158, at 492.
314. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 514.
315. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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imposed by the lack of a coherent theory of the mandatory public
domain is reason enough to get serious about developing one.
Notes & Observations
